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The WTO Appellate Body issues its report in the *EC – Seal Products* disputes

On 22 May 2014, the WTO Appellate Body issued its reports in the disputes *European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products* (hereinafter, *EC – Seal Products*), as triggered by Canada and Norway. The reports have been published in the form of a single document, where the analysis is common to both disputes, but the conclusions and recommendations are specific to each complaint.

The first dispute was triggered by Canada in November 2009, when it requested WTO consultations with the EU (formerly, the European Communities) concerning *Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products* (*i.e.*, the Basic Regulation), and *Regulation (EU) No. 737/2010 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products* (*i.e.*, the Implementing Regulation). Later in November 2009, Norway requested consultations with the EU concerning the same subject matter. In April 2011, it was decided that the two complaints be examined by a single panel (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 6 of 25 March 2011).

The EU's Seal Regime (*i.e.*, the framework laid down by the Basic Regulation and the Implementing Regulation) prohibits the placing on the EU's market of seal products (*e.g.*, seal skin, meat, fat, oil, organs, fur, clothing and footwear containing any components deriving from seals) with few exceptions. In particular, importation and marketing of seal products is permitted in limited, largely non-commercial instances, including where seal products result from hunts by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence, as well as where the products result from by-products of hunting that is regulated by national law and conducted for the sole purpose of the sustainable management of marine resources.

In their requests for the establishment of a panel, the complainants argued that the EU's Seal Regime was inconsistent, *inter alia*, with the EU's obligations under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter, the TBT Agreement). They also claimed that the EU violated Articles I:1, III:4 and XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, the GATT) and that the EU's Seal Regime could not be justified under Articles XX(a) or XX(b) of the GATT. In its report, which was issued on 25

November 2013, the panel established that the EU's Seal Regime amounted to a '*technical regulation*' within the meaning of the TBT Agreement and that, although it violated the EU's non-discrimination obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, it did not contravene Article 2.2 of the same agreement, inasmuch as the EU's measures contributed to their legitimate objective (*i.e.*, addressing EU citizens' concerns on seal welfare). The panel also found that the EU's Seal Regime was contrary to the non-discrimination obligations enshrined in Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, but did not find that the EU's measures amounted to a quantitative restriction under Article XI:I of the GATT (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 22 of 29 November 2013).

The findings of the panel have been partially upheld by the Appellate Body, while other key conclusions have been reversed. First, the Appellate Body disagreed with the panel on the definition of the EU's Seal Regime under the TBT Agreement. In its report, the panel had found that the EU's Seal Regime was a '*technical regulation*' within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, inasmuch as it met the three requirements identified in the *EC – Sardines* case (*i.e.*, that the document (i) apply to an identifiable product or group of products; (ii) be mandatory; and (iii) lay down product characteristics). In particular, with respect to the third requirement, the panel found that the EU's Seal Regime laid down '*product characteristics*' in the negative form (*i.e.*, by requiring that products placed on the EU market not contain seal), and that, through its exceptions, the EU's framework laid down characteristics for certain products.

Addressing the EU's argument on appeal that precisely the third requirement was not fulfilled, and hence that the EU's Seal Regime did not constitute a '*technical regulation*', the Appellate Body found that the panel had failed to consider the EU's Seal Regime '*as a whole*' (*i.e.*, to address both its prohibitive and permissive elements in a more holistic manner). The Appellate Body stated that the main feature of the EU's Seal Regime is not to impose '*characteristics*' on the products themselves but, rather, that it "*establishes the conditions for placing seal products on the market based on criteria relating to the identity of the hunter or the type or purpose of the hunt from which the product is derived*". Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that the EU's measures do not meet all the necessary conditions to qualify as a '*technical regulation*' and, as a result, it declared of no legal effect the panel's findings under the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body refrained from completing the legal analysis under the TBT Agreement on whether such '*conditions for placing seal products on the market*' amount to product-related process and production methods (*i.e.*, PPMs) or, on the contrary, whether they constitute non product-related PPMs, on grounds that the panel had not examined nor made any findings on this issue, and that the complainants had not focussed their arguments on that matter.

The Appellate Body then proceeded to examine the EU's appeals under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT (which envisage the most-favoured nation, or MFN, treatment and the national treatment obligations, respectively). On appeal, the EU submitted that the legal standard of the obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement applies equally to claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, and requested that the Appellate Body reverse the panel's finding of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT. The Appellate Body disagreed with the EU and, *inter alia*, noted that the principle that the provisions of the WTO '*Covered Agreements*' be read in a coherent and consistent manner does not mean that the legal standards for '*similar*' obligations (such as those contained in Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement) must be given '*identical*' treatment.

In this respect, the Appellate Body further clarified that, while WTO Members' right to regulate under the GATT is balanced by the '*General Exceptions*' clause in Article XX, there is no parallel provision under the TBT Agreement. In the context of the latter agreement, the Appellate Body indicated that the right to regulate is embedded within the specific context of Article 2.1 (which includes Annex 1.1, Article 2.2, and the second, fifth and sixth recitals of

the preamble of the TBT Agreement). In relevant part, these provisions state that WTO Members' right to regulate should not be constrained if the measures taken are necessary to fulfil certain legitimate policy objectives and provided that they are "*not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination [...] or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the [TBT] Agreement*". The Appellate Body explained that the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, as captured in the aforementioned provisions, supports the reading that Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement does not *a priori* prohibit any restriction to international trade. Nonetheless, and in view of the contextual differences between the relevant obligations in the GATT and the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body considered that the legal standard of non-discrimination of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement cannot be equally applied under Articles I:1 And III:4 of the GATT. In addition, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's position on the inconsistency of the EU's Seal Regime with Article I:1 of the GATT.

Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of the Appellate Body report concerns the assessment of the EU's Seal Regime against the backdrop of Article XX(a) of the GATT, concerning measures '*necessary to protect public morals*'. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EU's Seal Regime is provisionally justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT, although it reversed the finding that the EU had failed to establish that the discrimination operated by such measures was justified under the exception. The Appellate Body recalled that the panel had relied on its findings under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement (*i.e.*, that the EU's Seal Regime was not '*designed and applied in an even-handed manner*') to conclude that the EU's measures did not satisfy the conditions of the *chapeau* of Article XX (which require that provisionally-justified measures not be "*applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade*"). In relevant part, the Appellate Body noted that, despite the '*important parallels*' between the legal analyses under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the *chapeau* of Article XX of the GATT, the panel should have further explained '*why and how*' its analysis under the former was '*relevant and applicable*' under the latter. In light of the significant differences between the two provisions, the Appellate Body found that the panel should have conducted an independent analysis under the *chapeau* of Article XX and reversed the panel's finding that the EU's Seal Regime was not justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT. The Appellate Body then completed the legal analysis under the *chapeau* and ultimately reached the same conclusion as the panel (*i.e.*, that the EU's Seal Regime was not in line with the requirements of the *chapeau* and, therefore, that the EU's measures were not justified under the exception contained in Article XX(a) of the GATT).

This is not the first case where the exception on public morals has been discussed within the WTO context. Relying on the findings developed in the context of the *US – Gambling* dispute (which concerned the parallel provision under the General Agreement on Trade in Services), the panel found that the content of public morals can be characterised by a degree of variation, and that, for this reason, WTO Members should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concept of public morals according to their own systems and scales of values. On the extent of such '*margin*' recognised to WTO Members, the Appellate Body added that the panel's finding in *US – Gambling* that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate suggests that WTO Members may set different levels of protection even when responding to similar interests of moral concern. On such bases, the Appellate Body endorsed the finding that the EU's Seals Regime fell within the scope of Article XX(a) of the GATT. The immediate effect of this ruling is that WTO dispute settlement organs have established that concerns related to the mistreatment of animals can be moral in nature and that measures catering to such concerns can, therefore, be justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT, if the requirements of the *chapeau* are properly complied with.

Another key aspect of the Appellate Body reports is the consideration that the EU's Seal Regime is not covered by the TBT Agreement. According to the reports, the fact that the complainants focussed their arguments relating to the coverage by the TBT Agreement on whether the EU's measures lay down '*product characteristics*', and not on whether PPMs could play a role, together with the fact that the Panel had made no findings on this issue and that the question was not explored at the panel stage, deprived the Appellate Body from the possibility of completing the legal analysis in that regard. Still, and on a related comment, the Appellate Body noted that this is a point that '*raises important systemic issues*'.

Indeed, these '*systemic issues*' are potentially enormous and the repercussions of this decision could be severe with respect to many traded products that may be targeted because of their perceived (or alleged) moral, ethical, religious, environmental (etc.) shortcomings. A finding of the Appellate Body on where to draw the line between PPMs that fall, and those that do not fall, within the scope of the TBT Agreement would have ended a long-standing debate on the scope of this agreement, with relevant implications on a number of measures currently maintained by WTO Members. The immediate feeling is that this ground-breaking, but incomplete and rather open-ended, decision and interpretative guidance by the WTO will result in plenty of new cases as several WTO Members will presumably see fit to justify trade-restrictive measures, with the convenient '*blanket*' of GATT Article XX(a). The application of the requirements under the *chapeau* of GATT Article XX will be particularly instrumental to avoid instances of disguised protectionism and prevent abuse.

Recent developments surrounding the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US

On 19-23 May 2014, representatives from the EU and the US met in Arlington, Virginia for the fifth round of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter, TTIP) agreement. The round comes amid a series of developments regarding the agreement, which has continued to gain visibility and a certain amount of opposition by the general public.

The first round of TTIP negotiations took place on 8 July 2013, following the recommendations of the EU-US High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (hereinafter, HLWG) (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 4 of 22 February 2013). The final recommendation by the HLWG was that the TTIP should ambitiously address: (1) market access, including tariffs, services, investment and procurement; (2) regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers; and (3) rules addressing shared global trade challenges and opportunities. As negotiations have progressed, the general public has expressed concerns with some aspects of the agreement, including the perceived lack of transparency surrounding the negotiations, but also substantive characteristics of the negotiations such as investor-to-state dispute settlement (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 3 of 7 February 2014). For their part, the EU and the US have attempted to keep interested parties involved by releasing position papers and organising public consultations on key issues. For example, on 16 July 2013, the EU published six initial TTIP position papers covering cross-cutting and institutional provisions on regulatory issues, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, public procurement, trade and sustainable development and raw materials and energy.

Leading-up to the fifth negotiating round, the EU Commission published new position papers regarding five sectors under discussion. The position papers, released on 14 May 2014, expand on the previous position paper on cross-cutting and institutional provisions of regulatory issues by focusing on particular sectors, including chemicals, cosmetics, motor vehicles, pharmaceutical products and textiles and clothing. As outlined by the EU Commission, the papers put forward strategies for the parties to: (i) end the duplication of

product testing or plant inspection; (ii) increase mutual recognition; and (iii) align approval and recognition procedures for new products. In this regard, some areas are more difficult than others. For instance, EU and US chemical regulations differ significantly, and thus the EU maintains that harmonisation and mutual recognition are not feasible. Instead, in order to cut costs between the trading partners, the EU envisages joint cooperation to: (i) prioritise chemicals for assessment and agree on the best testing methods; (ii) classify and label chemicals; (iii) identify and address new issues; and (iv) better share data and protect confidential business information. Conversely, in the area of motor vehicles, mutual recognition does appear to be feasible. Additionally, the parties are devising ways to cooperate during the development of future automotive-related regulations. Reports indicate that, after the conclusion of the fifth negotiating round, EU Chief Negotiator Garcia Bercero acknowledged that harmonisation and mutual recognition are not possible in the chemicals sector, but that the EU and the US are looking for practical approaches to exchange information relevant to their respective regulatory processes. In the automotive sector, the parties are purportedly exploring how to properly use data to bridge the gap between technical standards on health, safety and environmental protection.

In addition to the publication of the EU's new position papers, the fifth TTIP negotiating round began just as the Huffington Post published a leaked EU draft non-paper (*i.e.*, a negotiating document sent to US officials from the EU Commission's Directorate-General for Trade) on raw materials and energy, dated 20 September 2013. Though it does not appear as though raw materials and energy were a focus of the most recent round of negotiations, the release of the draft non-paper provides an update on the relevant EU position paper published in July 2013. The draft non-paper explains that its provisions are based or inspired on existing provisions in the context of the WTO, the Energy Charter Treaty and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Review of the language shows that it also appears to reflect developments from recent WTO jurisprudence. Even the basic article in the draft non-paper laying out definitions can be associated to recent WTO disputes. For instance, the definition of '*raw materials*' specifically includes substances used in the manufacture of industry products and raw hides and skins, which were at issues in *China – Raw Materials* and *China – Rare Earths*, and *EC – Seal Products*, respectively. Additionally, '*energy goods*' includes electrical energy, which relates to *Canada – Renewable Energy*.

On a more substantive level, the draft non-paper addresses topics such as export restrictions, domestic price regulation, dual pricing, trading and export monopolies, general market access conditions, regulatory authority and local content requirements (hereinafter, LCRs), among others. Regarding LCRs, the EU proposes that parties shall not maintain LCRs, a policy that the EU Commission has also recommended to EU Member States domestically. This is also in line with recent WTO developments, such as the WTO Appellate Body's recommendation that Canada remove the LCRs that were at issue in *Canada – Renewable Energy*, and the American challenge of India's LCRs relating to solar panels. Regarding export restraints, the proposed provisions appear to incorporate by reference Article XI of the GATT, while also appearing to reference domestic US legislation. Article XI:1 of the GATT states that WTO Members may not institute or maintain "*prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures*". The US has had in place, since 1938, the Natural Gas Act (hereinafter, NGA), which allows the government to grant approval of exports of natural gas when it is consistent with the '*public interest*' (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 3 of 8 February 2013). Under US law, language in free trade agreements deeming exports of energy goods to automatically comply with domestic legislation fall within the '*public interest*'. Similarly, the *US Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975* directed the President to promulgate a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil produced in the US, but allows an exemption for exports determined to be consistent with the '*national interest*' (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 21 of 15 November 2013). These '*non-automatic export licenses*', as they are referred to under international law, have been criticised in the past,

including by American businesses attempting to sell energy products abroad, as they would likely violate Article XI:1 of the GATT if challenged before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Moreover, if the US continues to maintain its export restraints, such as these '*non-automatic export licenses*', it will be projecting conflicting stances on the issue. The US has repeatedly, and successfully, challenged the use of export restraints before the WTO, including in *China – Raw Materials* and *China – Rare Earths*. If the final version of the TTIP includes the EU's proposed provisions regarding export restraints on energy goods, it may signal that the US is finally considering removing its trade-restrictive measures in this area.

Together, the areas addressed by the position papers and the draft non-paper on raw materials and energy support the popular stance that the TTIP could possibly be the most progressive free trade agreement to date and act as a benchmark for future agreements. As it is shown by the topics covered in the position papers, the major impact of the TTIP will not be tariff-related because, for the most part, the EU and the US already enjoy relatively liberalised import regimes. Instead, from a long-term trade perspective, the lasting mark of success of the TTIP will likely be tied to its ability to adequately address non-tariff barriers and promote regulatory cooperation between the parties. The removal of non-tariff barriers and the increased compatibility of relevant regulations will likely account for the largest cost reductions and increased efficiencies for interested stakeholders in the EU and the US. Moreover, even businesses not located in the EU or the US should continue to monitor the progress of the TTIP negotiations. The standards and approaches adopted by the final agreement are poised to have an indirect effect on the standards of other countries.

Reducing food loss and food waste by amending labelling legislation on minimum durability of food?

At the meeting of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 19 May 2014, EU Member States' delegations discussed an information note from the Netherlands and Sweden in relation to food loss and food waste. The Netherlands and Sweden (supported by Austria, Denmark, Germany and Luxembourg) made some suggestions to address the problem, notably the exemption of products with a long shelf life from the requirement to provide a '*best before*' date on the label.

In the note '*Food losses and food waste in Europe and European legislation*' the Netherlands and Sweden argue that, in view of food security, limited natural resources and animal welfare, it is essential to improve the sustainability of food systems in which food losses and food waste have become of high proportion. During the Rio+20 conference in 2012, the '*Zero Hunger Challenge*' campaign was launched, where the eradication of food waste and food losses is one of the central aims. According to the note, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), an intergovernmental body set up in 1974 to serve as a *forum* for review and follow-up of food security policies, will publish policy recommendations in October 2014 on '*food losses and food waste in the context of sustainable food systems*'. Food losses and food waste have a social, environmental and economic dimension. Food waste has an environmental impact since it increases greenhouse gas emissions and water consumption.

The note informs that the EU Commission will launch a Communication on Sustainable Food, in which food losses and food waste will be a priority topic. An estimated 89 million tonnes of food is wasted in Europe each year. Reducing waste will have financial benefits for businesses, which will become more efficient, and for consumers, who will save money by wasting less. The note concludes that there may be various legislative areas where measures can be taken, but suggests to focus first on the '*best before*' date, as in many European countries date labelling is causing unnecessary food waste. The Netherlands and Sweden are of the opinion that more products, which have a long shelf life and retain their

quality for a very long time, could be exempted from the requirement to provide a '*best before*' date on the label. In addition, consumers often throw food away because of confusion about the meaning of the '*best before*' date. Research in the Netherlands shows that around 15% of food waste is due to the rules on product labelling. Products usually remain edible beyond the best before date.

In fact, a question often posed in this context relates to the difference between '*best before*' and '*use by*' dates. In simple terms, '*use by*' dates are on food that spoils quickly, such as smoked fish, meat and dairy products, and ready-prepared salads. After the end of the '*use by*' date on the label, the food must not be consumed because consumers' health could be at risk. '*Best before*' dates appear on a wide range of food, including frozen, dried and tinned foods. Except for eggs, the '*best before*' dates are more about quality than safety. When the date runs out, it does not mean that the food will be harmful, but it might begin to lose its flavour and texture.

Regulation (EU) No. 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of food information to consumers (hereinafter, the FIR), which applies as of 13 December 2014, provides in Article 2(2)(r) that the '*date of minimum durability of a food*' means the date until which the food retains its specific properties when properly stored. Article 9(1) of the FIR lists the mandatory particulars of food labelling, in particular under letter (f) the '*date of minimum durability*' or the '*use by*' date. Article 24 of the FIR sets out detailed rules for the minimum durability date, the use by date and the date of freezing (the last one being a novelty of the FIR). According to Article 24(1) of the FIR, in the case of foods which, from a microbiological point of view, are highly perishable and are therefore likely to constitute an immediate danger to human health after a short period, the date of minimum durability shall be replaced by the '*use by*' date. After the '*use by*' date has expired, a food shall be deemed to be unsafe. Paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the FIR establishes that the appropriate date shall be expressed in accordance with Annex X.

In particular, Annex X provides under point 1(d) that an indication of the date of minimum durability is not required for: fresh fruit and vegetables, including potatoes, which have not been peeled, cut or similarly treated (this derogation does not apply to sprouting seeds and similar products such as legume sprouts); wines, liqueur wines, sparkling wines, aromatised wines, and similar products obtained from fruit other than grapes, and certain beverages obtained from grapes or grape musts; beverages containing 10% or more by volume of alcohol; bakers' or pastry cooks' wares which, given the nature of their content, are normally consumed within 24 hours of their manufacture; vinegar; cooking salt; solid sugar; confectionery products consisting almost solely of flavoured and/or coloured sugars; and chewing gums and similar chewing products. Besides the above listed products, the FIR's predecessor (*i.e.*, *Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs*) also exempted soft drinks, fruit juices, fruit nectars and alcoholic beverages in individual containers of more than five litres (intended for supply to mass caterers) and individual portions of ice-cream from the obligation to bear a date of minimum durability.

Article 46 of the FIR establishes the procedure through which further exemptions in Annex X to the Regulation may be adopted. In order to take into account technical progress, scientific developments, consumers' health or consumers' need for information, the EU Commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 51 of the FIR under which the power to adopt delegated acts under, *inter alia*, Article 46 is conferred on the EU Commission for a period of five years after 12 December 2011. The EU Commission must draw-up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power referred to in, *inter alia*, Article 46 may be revoked at any time by the EU Parliament or by the Council. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the EU

Commission must notify it simultaneously to the EU Parliament and to the Council. An adopted delegated act enters into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the EU Parliament or the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act or if, before the expiry of that period, the EU Parliament and the Council have both informed the EU Commission that they will not object.

The debate is now open as to which products might in the future be exempted from indicating a '*best before*' label. Foods with a long shelf life, such as certain hard cheeses, dry pasta, bottled mineral water, rice or coffee have been mentioned as possible further exemptions because, if these products are stored adequately, they remain edible and normally safe after the expiry of the '*best before*' date. However, such new exemptions need to be coordinated with the food industry. Italian pasta producers have already expressed that, in addition to food safety issues, the protection of the organoleptic properties of the products is essential for consumers. Food must be safe and tasty, and the '*best before*' date is useful to indicate that the quality of the products has remained intact. In addition, omitting the '*best before*' date on certain products may confuse consumers even more when the product has been purchased some time ago and there remains no clear and transparent information on the packaging. Stakeholders must ensure that their legitimate interests are safeguarded when the procedure for adopting delegated acts on this matter is initiated.

Recently Adopted EU Legislation

Trade Remedies

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 570/2014 of 26 May 2014 terminating the partial reopening of the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of certain fatty alcohols and their blends originating in India, Indonesia and Malaysia*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 569/2014 of 23 May 2014 amending Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1389/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of trichloroisocyanuric acid originating in the People's Republic of China following a 'new exporter' review pursuant to Article 11(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009*

Food and Agricultural Law

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 579/2014 of 28 May 2014 granting derogation from certain provisions of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the transport of liquid oils and fats by sea*

- *Regulation (EU) No. 510/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 laying down the trade arrangements applicable to certain goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No. 1216/2009 and (EC) No. 614/2009*

Other

- *Regulation (EU) No. 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC*

- *Council Decision of 14 April 2014 on the conclusion of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Indonesia on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber products to the European Union*

- *Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Indonesia on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber products into the European Union*

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