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EU Commission's draft proposal reveals intended introduction of criteria for the differentiation of biofuels according to their sources of production

The EU appears to plan to reform its regulatory framework on biofuels, according to a draft on a '*Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the of the Council amending Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and the of the Council relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels amending Council Directive 93/12/EC; and amending Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC*' (hereinafter, the draft proposal), to be published in October, according to informed sources. The draft proposal, leaked earlier this week, aims at starting the transition from biofuels produced from food crops to '*advanced biofuels*', which originate from non-food sources and deliver substantial greenhouse gas savings, when taking into account their indirect land use change emissions.

In particular, the draft proposal is meant to amend two pieces of existing EU legislation, *i.e.* the '*Fuel Quality Directive*' ('*Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 98/70 as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC*') and the '*Renewable Energy Directive*' ('*Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC*'). The former lays down technical specifications on the quality of fuel used in transportation including, *inter alia*, a requirement for EU Member States to reduce by 6% the greenhouse gas intensity of transportation fuels by 2020 (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 18 of 7 October 2011). The latter establishes a common framework for the promotion of energy from renewable sources so as to meet the EU's climate change and energy policy objectives. To that end, the '*Renewable Energy Directive*' sets mandatory targets for the use of renewable energy by EU Member States. In particular, it establishes that, by 2020, 10% of the energy used for transport in the EU must originate from renewable sources. In addition, it lays down a number of sustainability criteria that biofuels need to comply with, so as to be accountable for the national targets for the use of renewable energy and to be eligible for financial support. The aim of such criteria is to prevent that an increased demand of such energy has a negative impact on biodiversity and the environment (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 10 of 21 May 2010).

The draft proposal acknowledges the failure of the existing regulatory framework in addressing the potential effects of indirect land use change, which allegedly offset part of the emission benefits of biofuels as compared to fossil fuels, therefore decreasing their overall sustainability. On the basis of provisions in both directives inviting the EU Commission to

review the impact of indirect land use change emissions and to propose ways of minimising such impact, the draft proposal seeks to tackle this issue by putting forward additional sustainability criteria that result in a regulatory differentiation of two categories of biofuels, essentially on the basis of the related risks of indirect land use change emissions. In relevant part, the draft proposal introduces a limit to the contribution made from biofuels originating from food crops ('*conventional biofuels*'), and an enhanced incentive scheme to promote the use of biofuels from alternative sources, such as forest residues, algae or municipal waste, and from sources that produce lower indirect land use change emissions ('*advanced biofuels*'). In particular, under the draft proposal the use of '*conventional biofuels*' will be capped to 5% of the final consumption of energy in transport in 2020, while '*advanced biofuels*' are attributed a favourable formula that makes them more suitable for the attainment of the national targets of renewable energy use. In addition, the draft proposal clearly states that only '*advanced biofuels*' should be eligible for financial support after 2020.

The regulatory framework proposed by the draft will have, in any case, to comply with all obligations of the EU under the WTO. Articles I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, the GATT) prohibit measures that discriminate against imported products *vis-à-vis* like foreign or domestic products, meaning that the different treatment granted to certain biofuels could not be translated into an origin-based discrimination. In this respect, the determination as to whether the '*advanced biofuels*' are to be considered '*like*' '*conventional biofuels*' is key for a finding of inconsistency. In addition, by imposing a (*de facto*) trade barrier for biofuels from food crops on the basis of their higher indirect land use change emissions, as compared to biofuels originating from other sources, the draft EU measure could also lead to a (*de facto*) ban on '*conventional biofuels*', which could in turn be inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT. The draft proposal could appear to result in a technical regulation within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter, TBT Agreement). Should that be the case, it would have to comply with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, which provides that technical regulations not result in discriminatory treatment granted to imported products *vis-à-vis* like products of domestic or foreign origin, and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which requires technical regulations not to create unnecessary barriers to trade.

The scheme proposed in the draft amendment resembles the EU Commission's initiative on fuels grading under the '*Fuel Quality Directive*' (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 5 of 9 March 2012), in that it is also targeted at classifying fuels from certain sources on the basis of their '*polluting value*', as resulting from the production process. The impact expected from the EU Commission's measures implementing the '*Fuel Quality Directive*' on certain types of fossil fuels (*i.e.*, fuels obtained from tar sands and shale oil) was so significant that it gave rise to extremely heavy opposition, and eventually to the postponement of their adoption. The draft proposal at issue looks poised to affect the growth of the biofuel market in the EU, should it pass through all stages of the legislative procedure and effectively come into force. In fact, the 5% level foreseen by the draft is of 0.5% higher than the actual level of consumption. Biofuel (both '*conventional*' and '*advanced*') producers are advised to follow very closely the developments in relation to the draft proposal, so they can adapt their businesses to the changing market needs and regulatory criteria.

The EU's Emission Trading Scheme and aviation: a WTO perspective

Governments of EU Member States represented in the Airbus *consortium* (*i.e.*, France, Germany, Spain and the UK) may soon try to push for the suspension of the application of the EU's Emission Trading System (hereinafter, ETS) to aviation activities. The request to suspend such scheme, which is applied to aviation activities as of January 2012, is connected to threats of retaliation from China over the purchase of Airbus aircrafts. The

extension of the ETS to aviation has met widespread opposition among airline companies and WTO Members.

The ETS is a market-based mechanism for reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions produced by certain industries and activities. It was introduced in the EU through *Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community* (hereinafter, Directive 2003/87/EC) and applied as of 2005 to energy-intensive industries, such as steel, mineral and paper sectors. A 2008 amendment of Directive 2003/87/EC extended the ETS to aviation as of 1 January 2012.

The scheme relies on three core elements: 1) the setting of a cap, which is reduced over time, on the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions that can be produced by the covered industries; 2) the allocation of emission allowances to operators within such industries; and 3) the possibility that such allowances be traded between companies. With particular reference to the aviation sector, the ETS applies to all domestic and international flights, which depart or arrive from an airport situated in an EU Member State, with some minor exceptions. The total quantity of allowances that may be allocated during the first year of implementation has been set to 97% of the historical aviation emissions (*i.e.*, a value determined by the EU Commission and based on the average of the annual emissions for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 of all aviation activities covered by ETS). This value will decrease to 95% for the period from 2013 to 2020. Aircraft operators will be allocated, free of charge, and upon application, 85% of the total allowances. The remaining 15% will be allocated through an auctioning system. Allowances may also be traded among aircraft operators. The scheme is enforced through monitoring and reporting obligations imposed on companies which must, at the end of each year, surrender enough allowances to cover all their emissions. Fines will be imposed by the competent authorities in EU Member States in the case of non-compliance.

The scheme forces EU and non-EU airline companies landing to, or departing from, an EU airport to surrender sufficient allowances to cover the emissions produced in connection with their flights, calculated on the basis of a formula which factors-in the fuel consumption. In addition, while the total emissions are capped to a level that decreases over time, the amount of allowances that will have to be purchased (*i.e.*, not allocated for free) is set to increase. In practical terms, the system will force aircraft operators to purchase increased amounts of allowances, or reduce operations with the EU.

The extension of the ETS to aviation looks poised to have an impact on trade in goods, inasmuch as it affects the transportation of goods and may give rise to trade discrimination and trade restrictions *vis-à-vis* certain imported products. In this respect, it may affect the EU's obligations under Articles I, II, III and XI of the GATT. In particular, to the extent that the operation of the ETS may result in the imposition of higher charges on imported products entering into the EU through air freight, through the '*pass through*' onto customers of the increased costs arising from the obligation to purchase emission allowances, the EU may be considered in violation of its commitments under Article II:1(b) of the GATT, which prevents WTO Members from imposing, in connection with importation, '*other duties or charges*' in excess of the levels committed under the *Schedule of Concessions*. Should the costs connected to the purchase of allowances not qualify as '*other duty or charge*' within the meaning of Article II:1(b) of the GATT, the extension of ETS to aviation may arguably be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT, inasmuch as it can be shown that, regardless of the presence or absence of an explicit restriction on imports, it limits competitive opportunities of products imported into the EU as air freight, or has a limiting effect on trade.

The ETS, as applied to aviation, appears to be in violation of the most-favoured nation obligation in Article I of the GATT, inasmuch as its operation allows for discrimination among

'*like*' imported products to take place (i) on the basis of the geographical proximity of the exporting third country to the territory of the EU and (ii) according to whether the products are transported via direct flights to the EU (products imported into the EU by direct flights will be subject to higher charges than products transported from the same country of origin via flights that are segmented into separate legs). Lastly, an argument can be made that the operation of the ETS may likely place EU products in a situation of comparative advantage in the EU domestic market *vis-à-vis* '*like*' imported products that are introduced through air transport, inasmuch as the latter will (partially or totally) bear the additional costs resulting from, *inter alia*, the purchase of the allowances and any cost deriving from compliance with the (administrative) requirements imposed on aircraft operators, in possible violation of Article III:4 of the GATT.

The Kyoto Protocol requires the so-called Annex I Parties to pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from fuel used for international aviation working through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (hereinafter, ICAO). The extension of the ETS to aviation was decided pursuant the failure of countries to reach an agreement on emission reductions within such framework. In this context, it may be seen as a move to '*force*' the achievement of a multilaterally agreed solution within such framework, which is now advocated by many, both countries and private parties.

The most troubling aspect of the EU's unilateral initiative is its '*extraterritorial*' reach, which makes it discriminatory and trade restrictive, the latter particularly in case of price sensitive products which will, over time and with the increase of emissions' allowances being auctioned by the EU, lose their competitive edge and market access opportunities. The opposition to the scheme has been fierce, with a number of governments threatening retaliation in various forms and introducing measures banning their airlines form complying with the scheme. Notably, a number of governments have subscribed, in February 2012, within the framework of a meeting held in Moscow, to a Joint Declaration in which they, *inter alia*, requested the EU to terminate the application of the ETS to aviation, urged the EU Member States to work within ICAO on a multilateral approach to address international civil aviation emissions and agreed on a basket of actions to be taken against the extension of the ETS to aviation, including assessing whether the scheme is consistent with the WTO.

The EU has so far indicated that it will not suspend the application of the ETS to aviation, unless concrete steps towards a multilateral agreement are taken within ICAO. The evolution of this matter is particularly important also as it stands to shape the EU's and other countries' stance with respect to emission reductions in shipping (maritime transport), an activity which may soon be covered by the ETS if no agreement is reached within the International Maritime Organisation, and which has been estimated to account for around 85% of goods turnover. What remains to be understood is why the EU, which has long preferred the multilateral and negotiated path to international cooperation, has decided to take such a controversial and unilateral stand, which clearly presents profiles of marked discrimination and trade distortiveness, if not outright WTO inconsistency. This is all the more troubling given the fact that, arguably, other less trade restrictive alternatives existed to achieve the same (legitimate and praiseworthy) objective (*i.e.*, carbon emission reductions and climate change control). For instance, the EU could have imposed strict(er) fuel efficiency standards to all aircrafts entering EU airspace, independently of the origin, routes flown and distance travelled. These standards apply to cars and trucks. Why can't they apply to aircrafts? The result would have been a less discriminatory and distortive system, more flights with less carbon emissions (the world is flying more and no regulator will change that with tax hikes), and most likely more fuel efficient aircrafts being sold by Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, Bombardier and the likes.

The Court of Justice of the EU establishes that wine may not be promoted and labelled as being '*easily digestible*' (*'bekömmlich'*)

In its preliminary judgment of 6 September 2012, *in the Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, the Court of Justice of the European Union* (hereinafter, the CJEU) established that wine may not be promoted and labelled as being '*easily digestible*' (in German '*bekömmlich*'). To highlight the importance of this case, further to the parties of the original dispute, five EU Member States' Governments (*i.e.*, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary and Finland), the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the EU Commission submitted observations in the proceedings.

Deutsches Weintor, a wine-growers' cooperative, markets wine from the *Dornfelder* and *Grauer/Weißer Burgunder* grape varieties described as '*mild edition*', accompanied with a reference to *'gentle acidity'*. More precisely, the label states: '*It owes its mildness to the application of our special* '*LO3*' *protective process for the biological reduction of acidity*'. The labels on the bottle necks bear the inscription: '*mild edition, easily digestible*'. The authority responsible for supervising the marketing of alcoholic beverages in the German State of Rhineland-Palatinate objected to the use of the description '*easily digestible*' on the ground that this is a health claim that is prohibited on alcoholic beverages by *Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods.* The German *Bundesverwaltungsgericht* (Federal Administrative Court), before which the dispute was brought to final appeal, asked the CJEU to clarify the scope of the prohibition in question and, if necessary, to rule on its compatibility with the fundamental rights of producers and distributors of wine, such as the freedom to choose an occupation and the freedom to conduct a business. A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of EU Member States, in disputes which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the CJEU about the interpretation of EU law.

Article 4 of Regulation No. 1924/2006, entitled '*Conditions for the use of nutrition and health claims*', provides in paragraph 3 that '*Beverages containing more than 1.2% by volume of alcohol shall not bear health claims*'. In its preliminary judgment, the CJEU established that the prohibition against using health claims to promote beverages containing more than 1.2% by volume of alcohol covers the description *'easily digestible'*, accompanied by a reference to the reduced content of substances frequently perceived by consumers as being harmful. According to the CJEU, the concept of a *'health claim'* does not necessarily presuppose the suggestion of an improvement in health as a result of the consumption of the food in question, but also any relationship which implies the absence or reduction of effects that are adverse or harmful to health and which would otherwise accompany or follow such consumption. *Deutsches Weintor* (and the Czech Government) argued that the notion of '*health claim*' as used in Regulation No. 1924/2006 should be narrowly construed and that, *inter alia*, the description *'easily digestible'* does not refer to health, but only to the '*general well-being*'. The CJEU clarified in the judgment that it is sufficient that the mere preservation of a good state of health, despite the potentially harmful consumption, is suggested. Furthermore, it is not only the temporary effect of consumption in a specific instance that must be taken into account, but also the cumulative effects of the regular consumption of the food on physical condition. In simplified terms, the concept of '*health claims*' under Regulation No. 1924/2006 does not necessarily mean that health shall be improved by consuming a food, it is sufficient that health does not get worse.

Prior to the proceeding at the CJEU, the Advocate General had stated that, in his opinion, '*it would be at odds to construe the concept of 'health claim' so narrowly as to exclude claims which imply a temporary beneficial effect on the physical condition. As a number of the parties have emphasised, this could remove from the protective scope of the Regulation a considerable number of products and related claims which, although implying a positive,*

albeit temporary, physiological effect, are nevertheless likely to encourage the consumption of the food or substance to which they relate'.

Finally, the CJEU held that a prohibition without exception on wine producers or distributors from making claims, even where claim is inherently correct, is compatible with the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* of the EU and also with the principle of proportionality. The Court grounded its reasoning in the fact that the prohibition strikes a fair balance between the protection of consumers' health, on the one hand, and the freedom of producers and distributors to choose an occupation and to conduct a business, on the other. The CJEU held that, by only highlighting the easy digestion of the concerned wine, the claim at issue is more likely to encourage its consumption, and ultimately, increase the dangers. Accordingly, the total prohibition of the use of such claims in the labelling and advertising of alcoholic beverages is necessary in order to protect consumers' health.

The CJEU's broad interpretation of the concept of '*health claims*' is not only relevant for alcoholic beverages, but also for foodstuffs in general, where health claims are subject to an EU authorisation procedure. The question is whether, in cases where the mere preservation of a good state of health is the claimed effect, claims which refer to the general temporary '*well being*' also fall under the concept of '*health claim*'. Recital 5 of *Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006* provides that generic denominations, which have traditionally been used to indicate a particularity of a class of foods or beverages that imply an effect on human health, such as '*digestive*' or '*cough drops*', should be exempted from the application of this Regulation. In October 2003, the EU Commission had already issued an interpretative document on the proposed regulation on health and nutrition claims entitled '*Myths & Misunderstandings*', where it stated that popular advertising slogans for food products, drinks and sweets (such as '*Haribo makes children happy'* or *'Red Bull gives you wings*') were not to be considered as health or nutrition claims.

However, with the preliminary judgment *in Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, the European Court of Justice* seems to have interpreted the concept of health claim so broadly that certain statements on foodstuffs referring to '*well being*', '*happiness*' or '*fitness*', may well be challenged as claiming the effect of the preservation of a temporary good state of health and may fall under the authorisation procedure of *Regulation (EC) No. 1924/2006.* In a preliminary ruling, the CJEU does not decide the dispute itself. It is now for the German *Bundesverwaltungsgericht* to dispose of the case in accordance with the CJEU's decision, which would be similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised. Thus, in the light of the new CJEU jurisprudence, it cannot be ruled out that the national authorities responsible for supervising the marketing of foodstuffs, in the EU and in the individual EU Member States' courts, will apply a broader interpretation of the concept of '*health claim*' and that certain claims on products will be challenged.

The EU Commission launches an investigation on dumping of Chinese solar panels and their component parts

On 6 September 2012, the EU Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imports of solar panels and their key components (including solar cells and wafers) from China. This announcement came after a complaint was lodged by the EU Pro Sun coalition (hereinafter, the complainants) an association representing a group of EU solar panel manufacturers, which claimed that the import volume and price of these products are causing substantial adverse effects to their industry. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations were initiated in the US in May 2012, resulting in the imposition of provisional duties.

The main rules which govern dumping are those outlined in *Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009, on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community* (hereinafter, the *Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation).* According to the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation, anti-dumping duties may only be imposed where, following an investigation, EU authorities were to determine that: 1) targeted solar panel producers and producers of component parts have engaged in dumping; 2) material injury has been suffered by the EU Solar industry; 3) a causal link between the dumping and injury is found; and finally, 4) the imposition of anti-dumping measures is not against the EU's interest (the '*Union interest test*'), on the basis of which such measures should not be more costly overall to the EU economy than the benefit that they would confer to the Pro Sun coalition). In conducting its investigations, the EU must ensure that it complies with its obligations under Article VI of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (*i.e.*, the WTO Antidumping Agreement). Dumping is found when the export price of the good is less than the *'normal value'* of an identical or like product not being exported to the EU. Since China is considered a non-market economy, according to the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation the '*normal price'* will be constructed based on those costs present in an '*analogue'* market-economy third country. In this case, the US is being used as a provisional comparison. This methodology generally leads to the imposition of higher anti-dumping duties (see Trade Perspectives, Issue No. 16 of 7 September 2012). Chinese producers may be able to request Market Economy Treatment under the EU's Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation, which results in the 'normal value' being primarily based on the company's domestic prices instead of third country prices. In order to obtain this treatment, producers must submit documentation evidencing, inter alia, that: 1) their price, cost and input decisions are made in response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard; 2) their firm has one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes; 3) the production costs and financial situation of the firm is not subject to significant distortion carried-over from the former non-market economy system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets and other write-offs; 4) they are subject to bankruptcy and property laws, which guarantee legal certainty and stability for operation of firms; and 5) exchange rate of conversions are carried-out at the market rate. The Commission takes 15 months to issue a final decision on whether the imposition of duties can be considered appropriate but provisional duties, which usually last for a period of six months, may be imposed within nine months, if considered appropriate.

This complaint is particularly interesting for the import value potentially affected since about 80% of all solar Chinese exports are destined for the EU market. This trade alone generated an estimated EUR 21 billion last year and it has been reported that the resulting case will be the most valuable anti-dumping case ever.

This case is also important inasmuch as it highlights a contentious aspect of the trade and environment debate. The growth of China's solar panel industry is reportedly attributed to governmental subsidies aimed at incentivising the use of renewable sources of energy. Measures of the sort are maintained in a number of countries as part of their energy and environmental policies. Anti-dumping duties imposed on (cheaper) environmental products may, *de facto*, discourage the purchase of such products, running counter the objectives of environmental policies pursued in the EU. EU authorities are faced with the choice of whether to protect the EU domestic industry producing the like environmental product through the imposition of anti-dumping duties to ensure that EU domestic downstream industry and consumers are granted cheaper access to environmentally-sound products. This apparent conflict may be reflected in the Union interest test.

Finally, the developments around this case should be monitored to see if, as has been suggested, the EU Commission will follow the US Department of Commerce's initiative in investigating the (allegedly) illegal subsidisation of the Chinese solar industry.

Recently Adopted EU Legislation

Market Access

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 847/2012 of 19 September 2012 amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) as regards mercury*

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 848/2012 of 19 September 2012 amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) as regards phenylmercury compounds*

Trade Remedies

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 833/2012 of 17 September 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People's Republic of China*

- *Commission Regulation (EU) No. 845/2012 of 18 September 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the People's Republic of China*

- *Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EU) No. 699/2012 of 30 July 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey*

Food and Agricultural Law

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 838/2012 of 18 September 2012 concerning the authorisation of Lactobacillus brevis (DSMZ 21982) as a feed additive for all animal species*

- *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 841/2012 of 18 September 2012 concerning the authorisation of Lactobacillus plantarum (NCIMB 41028) and Lactobacillus plantarum (NCIMB 30148) as feed additives for all animal species*

- *Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 74/2012 of 30 April 2012 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement*

- *Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 102/2012 of 30 April 2012 amending Protocol 47 (on the abolition of technical barriers to trade in wine) to the EEA Agreement*

- *Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 74/2012 of 30 April 2012 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement*

- *Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 78/2012 of 30 April 2012 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement*

- *Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 80/2012 of 30 April 2012 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) and Annex II (Technical regulations, standards, testing and certification) to the EEA Agreement*

Other

- *Corrigendum to Commission Implementing Decision 2011/435/EU of 19 July 2011 on the recognition of the 'Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels EU RED' scheme for demonstrating compliance with the sustainability criteria under Directives 2009/28/EC and 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council*

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