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By Tobias Dolle, Stella Nalwoga, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 21 August 2025, the EU and the US published their Joint Statement on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade<\/em><\/a>, (hereinafter, Framework Agreement<\/em>). The Framework Agreement<\/em>, which is not legally binding, introduces strikingly unbalanced trade concessions whereby the EU would eliminate nearly all tariffs on US-origin goods, while the US would, on top of existing tariffs, impose an additional \u2018reciprocal<\/em>\u2019 tariff of 15% on EU-origin imports that are not subject to a higher most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rate, and maintain MFN tariff rates on only a few selected EU-origin goods. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This article reviews the key terms of the Framework Agreement<\/em>, assesses their compatibility with the rules of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter, WTO), and analyses the implications for businesses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unilateralism over multilateralism?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 2 April 2025, basing his actions on the US\u2019 International Emergency Economic Powers Act<\/em> (IEEPA) of 1977, US President Trump<\/em> announced \u2018reciprocal<\/em>\u2019 tariffs ranging between 10% and 50% in order to \u201crebalance global trade flows<\/em>\u201d. These additional tariffs entered into effect on 8 August 2025, after having been postponed twice to allow for trade negotiations to unfold. These measures overtly violate the principle of non-discrimination and the US\u2019 bound tariff rates in its WTO Schedule of Commitments (see Trade Perspectives<\/em>, Issue No. 7 of 7 April 2025<\/a>), and are currently under litigation in the US for being potentially unconstitutional<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU, which was to be subject to an additional \u2018reciprocal<\/em>\u2019 tariff of 20%, vehemently condemned the US\u2019 measures as an affront to the rules-based multilateral trading system anchored in the WTO rules. At the same time, the EU committed to a negotiated solution with the US Administration. Initially, the EU had proposed \u201czero-for-zero<\/em>\u201d tariffs with the US, which the US rejected. The eventual political understanding<\/a> reached between US President Donald J, Trump<\/em> and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von den Leyen<\/em>, on 27 July 2025, signalled a shift towards bilateral concessions that undermine the WTO rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The US-EU Framework Agreement<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the Framework Agreement<\/em> published on 21 August 2025, the future EU-US Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade<\/em> would \u201cput the transatlantic trade and investment relationship on a solid footing<\/em>\u201d. More specifically, the Framework Agreement<\/em> foresees commitments on addressing tariff and non-tariff measures, as well as cooperation in key priority areas, such as energy and security, as well as investment commitments by EU businesses in strategic sectors in the US. <\/p>\n\n\n\n With respect to the tariff commitments, the Framework Agreement<\/em> foresees commitments by the EU to eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods and to extend preferential access to a broad range of US seafood and agricultural products. The US would \u201capply the higher of either the US Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate or a tariff rate of 15%, comprised of the MFN tariff<\/em>\u201d, and \u201capply only the MFN tariff<\/em>\u201d to \u201cunavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors<\/em>\u201d, from 1 September 2025. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Framework Agreement<\/em> also addresses EU-origin goods currently subject to tariffs based on Section 232<\/em> of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962 <\/em>and goods currently under investigation under Section 232<\/em>. Notably, possible future additional tariffs on pharmaceutical products, currently subject to a Section 232 investigation, would be capped at 15% and the same tariff rate is foreseen for cars and car parts. With respect to steel, aluminium, and derivative products, the EU and the US committed to \u201cring-fencing their respective domestic markets from overcapacity, while ensuring secure supply chains between each other, including through tariff-rate quota solutions<\/em>\u201d. The parties further agreed to negotiate rules of origin to ensure that the \u201cbenefits of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade accrue predominantly<\/em>\u201d to the EU and the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Evident WTO incompatibility<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU-US Framework Agreement<\/em> has already triggered considerable debate over its consistency with WTO obligations. While both sides portray the Framework Agreement<\/em> as a pragmatic step to stabilising transatlantic trade relations, its structure raises fundamental legal concerns. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Under Article I:1 of the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, <\/a>GATT) 1994, any tariff advantage granted to any country must be extended to all WTO Members. As a derogation from this non-discrimination principle, Article XXIV of the GATT allows WTO Members, within the context of a trade agreement, to grant preferential terms of market access to each other in ways that would not be extended to other WTO Members. In order to benefit from that derogation, Article XXIV(8)(b) of the GATT requires that the Agreement eliminate \u201cduties and other restrictive regulations of commerce<\/em>\u201d with respect to \u201csubstantially all the trade<\/em>\u201d between them. A similar provision is contained in Article V of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter, GATS). While there is no official WTO interpretation of the concept of \u2018substantially all trade\u2019<\/em>, it is generally considered as liberalising at least 90% of the total value of trade among the parties. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In its current form, the Framework Agreement<\/em> reveals significant liberalisation asymmetries, whereby the EU would eliminate all tariffs on US industrial and grant preferential market access for a wide range of US seafood and agricultural goods, while the US would merely reduce an already WTO-inconsistent unilateral additional tariff from 20% to 15% and maintain MFN rates on a few selected EU-origin goods. In substance, the Framework Agreement<\/em> provides no trade liberalisation by the US, but only a reduction of the WTO-illegal tariffs that had been threatened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Framework Agreement<\/em> evidently falls short of meeting the WTO legal standard for a preferential trade agreement. Falling short of that standard, the implementation of the EU\u2019s concessions exclusively for the benefit of the US would violate the WTO\u2019s non-discrimination principle under Article I:1 of the GATT and Article II of the GATS. Thus, in theory, the EU would be required to extend those benefits to all WTO Members. On 28 August 2025, the European Commission (hereinafter, Commission) published<\/a> two legislative proposals intended to implement some of the EU\u2019s commitments, limiting the tariff and tariff-quota advantages solely to goods originating in the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Article XXIV(5)(c) of the GATT permits interim agreements if such agreements are accompanied by \u201ca plan and schedule for the formation of such […] a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time<\/em>\u201d, the Framework Agreement<\/em>only provides a vague and non-time bound \u201cintention<\/em>\u201d by the US and the EU to \u201cfurther expanded over time to cover additional areas and continue to improve market access and increase their trade<\/em>\u201d, offering no clear plan or schedule. Finally, both parties have yet to notify the WTO Members of their Framework Agreement<\/em>, as required under Article XXIV(7)(c) of the GATT in order to \u201cenable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate<\/em>\u201d. It will likely only be a matter of time until other WTO Members raise questions concerning this and other WTO-illegal \u2018trade deals<\/em>\u2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In a recent interview<\/a>, Ignacio<\/em> Garcia Bercero<\/em>, a Senior Fellow at Bruegel<\/em>, a think tank based in Brussels, who acted as the EU\u2019s Chief Negotiator for the failed negotiations on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), emphasised that there had \u201cto be a clear perspective of moving towards a relationship with the US based on global trade rules, even though this might take some time<\/em>\u201d, including, \u201cas a minimum<\/em>\u201d, the introduction of \u201ca very clear time limitation<\/em>\u201d to the Agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Limited gains and lingering uncertainty for EU businesses?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In past decades, tariffs had gradually declined through WTO rounds and tariff reduction commitments in preferential trade agreements, but, in recent years, tariffs re-emerged as a trade policy tool, particularly in US trade policy. The Framework Agreement<\/em> does not leave EU businesses significantly better off than before, since it falls short of a trade liberalisation that would have further reduced MFN tariffs, instead merely providing for a \u2018lesser evil<\/em>\u2019 in the form of reduced additional tariffs. On 3 September 2025, during a press conference, the Chair of the European Parliament\u2019s Committee on International Trade (INTA), Bernd Lange, <\/em>stressed that the Framework Agreement<\/em> failed to deliver the legal certainty and commercial predictability promised by the Commission, pointing to the US\u2019 expansion of Section 232 tariffs to 407 additional steel and aluminium derivative products and US President Trump\u2019s<\/em> threats of additional tariffs on countries enforcing digital taxes. Most significantly, the Framework Agreement<\/em> does not include commitments to shield EU businesses from the US\u2019 increasing use of Section 301 measures adopted under the US Trade Act of 1974<\/em>, as threatened by US President Trump<\/em>, on 6 September 2025, following the Commission\u2019s imposition of a fine of USD 3.45 billion on US-based company Google<\/em> for breaching EU competition rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Way forward <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n As long as there is no final official text of the EU-US Framework Agreement<\/em>, its legal contours remain uncertain, and its WTO consistency highly questionable. As both the EU and the US take steps towards implementing the Framework Agreement<\/em> \u201cin line with their relevant internal procedures<\/em>\u201d, the coming months will determine whether it will deliver some degree of certainty and genuine market opportunities. Overall, the Framework Agreement<\/em> sets a troubling precedent by undermining both the WTO\u2019s credibility and the EU\u2019s role as its strongest proponent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n By Imelda Jo Anastasya, Joanna Christy, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 30 June 2025, Indonesia\u2019s Ministry of Trade enacted MoT Regulation No. 16 of 2025 on Import Policy and Regulation<\/em><\/a>, which took effect on 29 August 2025. MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em> revoked MoT Regulation No. 36 of 2023 on Import Policy<\/em><\/a>. MoT Regulation 16\/2025 <\/em>introduces several changes to simplify technical import requirements in Indonesia and pursues the deregulation of import policies, notably: 1) A more flexible timeframe for businesses to request an extension of their \u2018Import Approval<\/em>\u2019; 2) The introduction of formal definitions for the concepts of \u2018Restricted Imports<\/em>\u2019, \u2018Prohibited Imports<\/em>\u2019, and \u2018Unrestricted Imports<\/em>\u2019, which is poised to reduce the legal ambiguities and protect domestic industries; and 3) The revocation of the \u2018Import Approvals<\/em>\u2019 requirement for specific sectors.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n This article discusses the key changes introduced by MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em>, their implications for stakeholders, and practical steps for businesses to consider.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regulating imports into Indonesia<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Indonesia\u2019s new MoT Regulation 16\/2025 <\/em>updates the regulatory framework for imports. This Regulation was introduced following the deregulation of Indonesia\u2019s import policies, as announced by Indonesia\u2019s Minister of Trade, Budi Santoso, <\/em>on 30 June 2025. According to a press release<\/a>, Indonesia\u2019s Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Airlangga Hartarto<\/em>, the Government would provide greater <\/em>\u201cease for business actors while simultaneously creating and encouraging competitiveness<\/em>\u201d, noting that the deregulation aimed to \u201cfoster an ecosystem that continually generates employment opportunities and safeguards investment, especially in labor-intensive sectors<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em>, the Government of Indonesia introduced eight dedicated MoT Regulations, each providing import requirements for Indonesia\u2019s key business sectors, namely: 1) Textiles and textile products; 2) Agricultural and livestock goods; 3) Salt and fishery commodities; 4) Chemicals, hazardous materials, and mining materials; 5) Electronic and telematics goods; 6) Certain industrial goods; 7) Consumer goods; and 8) Used goods and non-hazardous, non-toxic waste. These regulations aim at more effectively supervising imports and at allowing the Government to adapt quickly to future changes by amending only the relevant sectoral regulation instead of the general regulatory framework for imports. The new regulations may also serve to protect domestic industries, as each of the regulations continues to require importers to obtain an \u2018Import Approval<\/em>\u2019 for the covered goods, which will enable the Government to control import volumes based on domestic supply and demand conditions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Key novelties<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em> introduces several important novelties into Indonesia\u2019s regulatory framework for imports, building on and refining the previous rules under MoT Regulation 36\/2023<\/em>. The changes aim at providing clearer guidance, streamline processes, and enhance regulatory oversight over import activities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 1) Shortened timeframe for import approval extensions<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Pursuant to Article 1(20) of MoT Regulation 16\/2025, in order to import goods, businesses in Indonesia must obtain an \u2018Import Approval<\/em>\u2019, which is a type of business licence. This licence is valid only for a specific period, after which it must either be renewed or extended if the importer wishes to continue its import operations. To obtain an extension, the importer must submit an application to the MoT. Under the previous regime, Article 15 of MoT Regulation 36\/2023<\/em>required importers to submit an application for an extension no later than seven working days before the expiry date of the Import Approval<\/em>. The deadline required businesses to finalise their import approval applications at least seven working days before its expiry date. Article 21 of MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em> now provides for more flexibility by allowing submissions up to only two working days before the expiry, while allowing applications to be filed as early as thirty days prior. This means businesses now have a longer window to prepare and submit their applications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2) New definitions for import categories<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Article 1 of MoT Regulation 16\/2025 <\/em>clarifies the definitions for \u2018Restricted Imports<\/em>\u2019, \u2018Prohibited Imports<\/em>\u2019, and \u2018Unrestricted Imports<\/em>\u2019. These concepts, although perhaps self-explanatory, were not expressly defined under MoT Regulation 36\/2023<\/em>. According to Article 1(4) of MoT Regulation 16\/2025,<\/em> \u2018Restricted Imports<\/em>\u2019 refers to goods whose importation requires a specific permission by the Government. Article 1(5) defines \u2018Prohibited Imports<\/em>\u2019 as goods that are prohibited to be imported, while Article 1(6) defines \u2018Unrestricted Imports<\/em>\u2019 as goods that do not fall within the restricted or prohibited categories. The clarification of the definitions should reduce legal ambiguity concerning the import categories and facilitate administration, particularly the licensing procedures in which businesses need certainty on whether a product falls within the restricted, prohibited, or unrestricted categories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3) Revocation of sectoral Import Approvals<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Under Article 93 of MoT Regulation 16\/2025<\/em>, the Government revoked the \u2018Import Approvals<\/em>\u2019 requirement for a certain number of goods, namely: 1) Forestry products; 2) Plastic raw materials; 3) Subsidised fertilisers; 4) Other fuels – fuel and fuel blends; and 5) Other fuels – other than fuel and fuel blends. This measure should facilitate the import of such goods into Indonesia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Implications for importers<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The regulation aims at improving transparency and predictability with respect to imports. Clearer definitions of import categories might reduce ambiguities at the border and provide Customs officers with firmer legal grounds for decision-making. The more flexible deadline for Import Approval<\/em> extensions allows businesses additional time to prepare their application, the definitions for import categories may help importers in categorising goods for licensing and compliance purposes, and the revocation of the \u2018Import Approval<\/em>\u2019 requirement for specific goods means that importers no longer need to obtain and wait for an approval to import such goods. Under WTO rules, import licensing may be imposed as long as it complies with the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures<\/em><\/a>. Notably, in its implementation, such licensing requirements must be fair and transparent and may not restrict trade, as provided under Article 3(2) of the Import Licensing Agreement<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Chairwoman of the Indonesian Employers\u2019 Association<\/em>, Shinta Widjaja Kamdani<\/em>, considers the reform \u201ca strong signal that the Government is serious about listening to and directly responding to various inputs and aspirations from the business community, including from labour-intensive sectors that are currently facing significant challenges due to weakening global purchasing power and rising production costs\u201d<\/em>. The Executive Director of the Indonesian Textile Association<\/em>, Danang Girindrawardana<\/em>, underlined that the Government should \u201cmake sure that policy inconsistencies do not happen<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To ensure compliance and avoid sanctions, importers should review the new regulatory framework and their internal processes to meet the new deadlines and update classifications in line with the new legal definitions. Strengthening compliance systems will help safeguard operations and competitiveness under the revised regulatory framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n By Amanda Carlota<\/em>, Ignacio Carre\u00f1o Garc\u00eda, and Tobias Dolle<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 30 July 2025, as part of a broader review of the EU\u2019s Common Agricultural Policy, the European Commission (hereinafter, Commission) presented its Proposal<\/a> for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1308\/2013 as regards the school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme (\u2018EU school scheme\u2019), sectoral interventions, the creation of a protein sector, requirements for hemp, the possibility for marketing standards for cheese, protein crops and meat, application of additional import duties, rules on the availability of supplies in time of emergencies and severe crisis and securities<\/em>. With this proposal, the Commission seeks to amend Regulation (EU) No 1308\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products<\/em><\/a> <\/em>(i.e.<\/em>, the Common Market Organisation Regulation, hereinafter, CMO Regulation), introducing further meat denominations that are to be exclusively reserved for products derived from animals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This article analyses the Commission\u2019s initiative, a similar amendment in another legislative initiative, and whether such proposals are in line with relevant EU case law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Defining \u2018meat<\/em>\u2019 as edible part of an animal and introducing reserved designations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In its Proposal, the Commission foresees to introduce into the CMO Regulation additional specific legal provisions \u201cto protect meat-related terms in order to enhance transparency in the internal market as regards food composition and nutritional content and ensure that consumers can make well-informed choices, particularly for those seeking a specific nutritional content that is traditionally associated with meat products<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably, the Commission proposes to insert a Part Ia into Annex VII to the CMO Regulation on \u2018meat and meat products designations<\/em>\u2019, which states that the term \u2018meat<\/em>\u2019 \u201cmeans exclusively the edible parts of an animal<\/em>\u201d and lists 29 designations that are to be \u201creserved for products derived exclusively from meat at all stages of marketing<\/em>\u201d. This includes terms referring generally to the type of meat itself (e.g.<\/em>, <\/em>\u2018beef<\/em>\u2019, \u2018pork<\/em>\u2019, \u2018veal<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018chicken<\/em>\u2019), as well as to specific parts or cuts (e.g.<\/em>, \u2018drumstick<\/em>\u2019, \u2018tenderloin<\/em>\u2019, \u2018T-bone<\/em>\u2019 or \u2018rump<\/em>\u2019) and preparations (e.g.<\/em>, \u2018bacon<\/em>\u2019) thereof. Currently, Part I of Annex VII to the CMO Regulation only protects designations related to the meat of bovine animals aged less than 12 months (e.g.<\/em>, \u2018veal<\/em>\u2019 in English). The proposal appears to reflect the sentiments of at least twelve EU Member States, namely Austria, Czechia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, that, in June 2025, reportedly presented a note to the EU\u2019s Agricultural and Fisheries Council stating that it was \u201cessential that foods which imitate, mimic or substitute foods of animal origin do not mislead the consumer by their labelling as to their true nature<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Commission claims that the restriction \u201cis necessary to acknowledge the natural composition of meat and meat products<\/em>\u201d, as \u201cmeat-related terms often carry cultural and historical significance<\/em>\u201d. Notably, certain terms used in the context of meat, such as \u2018burger<\/em>\u2019, \u2018sausage<\/em>\u2019, and \u2018steak\u2019, have not been included in the Commission\u2019s Proposal\u2019s list. Given that such terms are usually in the centre of debates on plant-based meat alternatives, it may very well be that they may still be suggested or even be included in the list as the Proposal goes through the ordinary legislative procedure in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In a separate initiative in the context of the Commission\u2019s Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulations (EU) No 1308\/2013, (EU) 2021\/2115 and (EU) 2021\/2116 as regards the strengthening of the position of farmers in the food supply chain<\/em><\/a>, an Amendment 645<\/a> has been proposed in the European Parliament to add a new Part IIa to Annex VII to the CMO Regulation on \u2018Meat, meat products and meat preparations<\/em>\u2019. With respect to \u2018meat<\/em>\u2019, it states, in relevant part, that \u201cThe Government of Indonesia revamps the regulatory framework for imports<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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No more plant-based \u2018bacon<\/em>\u2019? European Commission seeks to prohibit the use of animal-derived meat-related terms on plant-based meat products<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n