{"id":1621,"date":"2025-10-06T03:24:05","date_gmt":"2025-10-06T03:24:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/?post_type=trade-perspectives&#038;p=1621"},"modified":"2025-10-06T03:24:05","modified_gmt":"2025-10-06T03:24:05","slug":"6-october-2025","status":"publish","type":"trade-perspectives","link":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/trade-perspectives\/6-october-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"6 October 2025"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong><a href=\"#US\">Beyond IEEPA: The US Administration\u2019s \u2018<em>toolbox<\/em>\u2019 for further tariff measures<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#ASEAN\">Towards more harmonised nutrition labelling? ASEAN Member States endorse ASE<em>AN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines<\/em><\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#Food\">Does existing EU law adequately address \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 of food products? EU Member States address growing concerns<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#Legislation\">Recently adopted EU legislation<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"US\"><strong>Beyond IEEPA: The US Administration\u2019s \u2018<em>toolbox<\/em>\u2019 for further tariff measures<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>By Tobias Dolle, Stella Nalwoga, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 5 November 2025, the US Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on the legality of the additional tariffs imposed by the US Administration on the basis of the US\u2019&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/USCODE-2023-title50\/pdf\/USCODE-2023-title50-chap35-sec1701.pdf\"><em>International Emergency Economic Powers Act<\/em><\/a><em>&nbsp;<\/em>(hereinafter, IEEPA). The US Supreme Court\u2019s decision, expected by the end of the year, will be pivotal in determining the scope of the US President\u2019s authority under the IEEPA, which forms the basis for various tariff measures taken over the past months. The US Administration has already made clear that, whatever the decision of the Supreme Court, imposing new and additional tariffs would continue to be a cornerstone of the trade policy of this Administration. Indeed, the US Administration has other instruments in its&nbsp;<em>\u2018toolbox<\/em>\u2019 of trade measures that it can wield against its trading partners in order to advance its&nbsp;<em>America First Trade Policy<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article discusses the \u2018<em>toolbox<\/em>\u2019 of different trade measures available to the US Administration and examines the implications of framework agreements negotiated by certain trading partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Legal challenges to IEEPA tariffs before the US Courts<\/em><\/strong><strong><em><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The IEEPA authorises the US President to \u201c<em>deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat<\/em>\u201d. US President&nbsp;<em>Donald J. Trump&nbsp;<\/em>used the IEEPA as the legal basis for imposing a universal baseline tariff of 10% on all countries, additional country-specific \u2018<em>reciprocal<\/em>\u2019 tariffs, as well as tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China in response to their alleged failure to address illegal immigration and fentanyl trafficking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 29 May 2025, the US Court of International Trade ruled that US President&nbsp;<em>Trump&nbsp;<\/em>had exceeded his statutory authority under the IEEPA in imposing the tariffs and the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision on 29 August 2025. The tariffs remain in place while the US Administration\u2019s appeal to the US Supreme Court is pending. Given the possibility of the IEEPA tariffs being declared illegal, the US Administration may decide to base similar trade measures on other available legal bases.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Addressing imports that \u201cthreaten to impair US national security\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another trade measure in the US\u2019 toolbox is found in&nbsp;<em>Section 232<\/em>&nbsp;of the US&nbsp;<em>Trade Expansion Act of 1962<\/em>. Based on an investigation and affirmative determination by the US Department of Commerce that certain imports threaten to impair US national security, the President of the US may determine appropriate action to \u201c<em>adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To date, the US Administration has used&nbsp;<em>Section 232<\/em>&nbsp;to impose additional tariffs on imports from all trading partners of steel and aluminium (50%), cars and car parts (25%), copper (50%) timber (ranging from 10 to 50%). Other investigations, including on industrial machinery, robotics, pharmaceutical products, medical devices and personal protective gear, critical minerals, aircraft, and wind turbines, remain pending.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Importantly, past legal challenges regarding&nbsp;<em>Section 232<\/em>&nbsp;measures did not succeed, with the US Supreme Court&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/426\/548\/\">concluding<\/a>&nbsp;that the Statute grants the&nbsp;US President broad discretionary authority to act on national security concerns related to imports, while setting&nbsp;clear preconditions for presidential action, and also limiting the President\u2019s authority to actions deemed \u201c<em>necessary<\/em>&nbsp;to&nbsp;<em>adjust imports<\/em>\u201d to protect national security (see&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives<\/em>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/25.05.04-TP-9-2025-Draft-for-circulation.pdf\">Issue No. 9 of 5 May 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Addressing unreasonable or discriminatory acts of trading partners<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;of the&nbsp;<em>US Trade Act of 1974<\/em>&nbsp;grants the Office of the US Trade Representative (hereinafter, USTR) authority to investigate and address \u201c<em>unreasonable or discriminatory acts, policies, or practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce<\/em>\u201d. In order to address such practices,&nbsp;<em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;states that \u201c<em>actions may be taken that are within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign country<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this regard,&nbsp;<em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;authorises the USTR to: 1) \u201c<em>suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country<\/em>\u201d; 2) Enter into a binding agreement with the foreign government to either cease the conduct in question or compensate the US; and 3) \u201c<em>impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines appropriate<\/em>\u201d.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;actions automatically terminate after four years, unless the USTR receives a request for continuation and conducts a review of the case. During US President&nbsp;<em>Trump<\/em>\u2019s first term, the US had imposed&nbsp;<em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;tariffs of 25% on a wide range of imports from China due to China\u2019s practices related to forced technology transfers and violations of intellectual property rights . These tariffs were reviewed in May 2024 and are still in force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The current US Administration initiated a new&nbsp;<em>Section 301<\/em>&nbsp;investigation into&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/trade-topics\/enforcement\/section-301-investigations\/section-301-brazils-acts-policies-and-practices-related-digital-trade-and-electronic-payment\"><em>Brazil\u2019s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Digital Trade and Electronic Payment Services; Unfair, Preferential Tariffs; Anti-Corruption Enforcement; Intellectual Property Protection; Ethanol Market Access; and Illegal Deforestation<\/em><\/a>, which could result in the introduction of trade restrictions vis-\u00e0-vis Brazil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Tariff measures to address serious injuries or threats thereof to domestic industries<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Section 201<\/em>&nbsp;of the&nbsp;<em>US Trade Act of 1974&nbsp;<\/em>concerning safeguard measures states that if the US International Trade Commission determines that an article is being imported into the US \u201c<em>in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article<\/em>\u201d, the US President must \u201c<em>take all appropriate and feasible action within his power which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs<\/em>\u201d.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Section 201<\/em>&nbsp;explains that \u201c<em>a positive adjustment to import competition<\/em>\u201d occurs when: 1) \u201c<em>the domestic industry is able to compete successfully with imports<\/em>\u201d after termination of the safeguard measure, or \u201c<em>the domestic industry experiences an orderly transfer of resources to other productive pursuits<\/em>\u201d; and 2) \u201c<em>dislocated workers in the industry experience an orderly transition to productive pursuits<\/em>\u201d. Actions that the US President can impose under Section 201 include \u201c<em>an increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on the imported article<\/em>\u201d, \u201c<em>a tariff-rate quota on the article<\/em>\u201d, and \u201c<em>a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the article into the United States<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In terms of duration, the US President may grant import relief for an initial period of up to four years and extend it one or more times, up to a maximum of eight years.&nbsp;<em>Section 201<\/em>&nbsp;actions are deemed consistent with US international obligations if they conform to the World Trade Organization\u2019s Agreement on Safeguards. Since 2017, during the first term of US President&nbsp;<em>Trump<\/em>, safeguard measures on certain imports remain in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/issue-areas\/enforcement\/section-201-investigations\">effect<\/a>, including on solar cells and modules and on large residential washing machines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Temporary tariff measures to address balance of payments crises<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The balance of payments refers to a statistical summary of a country\u2019s trade in goods, services, and cross-border financial flows&nbsp;<em>vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em>&nbsp;the rest of the world in a specific period and an important economic indicator that tracks the flow of resources and money. With respect to the balance of payments,&nbsp;<em>Section 122<\/em>&nbsp;of the&nbsp;<em>Trade Act of 1974<\/em>&nbsp;allows the President of the US to take action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Section 122 provides that, \u201c<em>whenever fundamental international payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports<\/em>\u201d in order to:&nbsp;<em>\u201c(1) to deal with large and serious United States balance of-payments deficits, (2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or (3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium<\/em>\u201d, the US President must proclaim: \u201c<em>(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in the form of duties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on articles imported into the United States; (B) temporary limitations through the use of quotas on the importation of articles into the United States; or (C) both a temporary import surcharge described in subparagraph (A) and temporary limitations described in subparagraph (B)\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The US President may impose&nbsp;<em>Section 122<\/em>&nbsp;actions for a period not exceeding 150 days unless extended by the US Congress.&nbsp;<em>Section 122<\/em>&nbsp;has not been used before and, therefore, US Courts have had no occasion to interpret its provisions. Unlike the other legal bases,&nbsp;<em>Section 122<\/em>&nbsp;does not condition the US President\u2019s authority to impose tariffs on any investigation or factual finding by an executive agency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Tariff mitigation through trade agreements<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although all of the above legal avenues for imposing additional tariffs have various procedural and substantial requirements and\/or limitations, they offer a legal foundation for durable trade restrictions. For US trading partners, this underscores a persistent vulnerability. Even if one set of tariffs falls, a new measure may be forthcoming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over the past few months, key US trading partners, such as China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and the UK, have negotiated \u201c<em>framework agreements<\/em>\u201d with the US Administration to obtain tariff relief, notably in relation to tariffs imposed on the basis of the IEEPA tariff and&nbsp;<em>Section 232<\/em>. Although these framework agreements are more political declarations than legally binding commitments, they appear to deliver relief for certain trading partners. For instance, US President&nbsp;<em>Trump<\/em>\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/09\/adjusting-imports-of-timber-lumber-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states\/\"><em>Executive Order<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;announcing the imposition of&nbsp;<em>Sections 232<\/em>&nbsp;tariffs on wood imports, issued on 29 September 2025, provides that \u201c<em>pursuant to the terms of the framework agreements<\/em>\u201d that the US had negotiated with the EU and Japan, the tariff rate applicable to them would \u201c<em>not exceed 15 percent<\/em>\u201d.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Framework agreements as a solution?&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even if the IEEPA tariffs were to be declared illegal by the US Supreme Court, the tariff risk will persist, as the US Administration could pivot to other measures in its \u2018<em>toolbox<\/em>\u2019 to pursue&nbsp;&nbsp;comparable measures. In this regard, framework agreements appear to present a solution, enabling trading partners to manage the risk of future tariff measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Businesses and governments should adopt an expert-guided and evidence-based proactive engagement strategy with the US Administration to secure tailored relief or exemptions from current and future actions, regardless of the legal basis. At least for now, such agreements appear to shield off recent new tariffs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"ASEAN\"><strong>Towards more harmonised nutrition labelling? ASEAN Member States endorse\u00a0<em>ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines<\/em><\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>By Imelda Jo Anastasya, Joanna Christy, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In August 2025, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter, ASEAN) endorsed the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/asean.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/ASEAN-Guidelines-on-Nutrition-Labelling-Final-Endorsed-62ACCSQ-1.pdf\"><em>ASEAN Guidelines on Nutrition Labelling<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;(hereinafter, ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines), which were finalised during the 39<sup>th<\/sup>&nbsp;Meeting of the&nbsp;<em>Prepared Foodstuff Product Working Group<\/em>&nbsp;(hereinafter, PFPWG) held from 31 October to 1 November 2024. The&nbsp;<em>ASEAN<\/em>&nbsp;<em>Nutrition Labelling Guidelines&nbsp;<\/em>recommend \u201c<em>procedures for the nutrition labelling of foods<\/em>\u201d and aim,&nbsp;<em>inter alia,<\/em>&nbsp;at ensuring that&nbsp;nutrition labelling across ASEAN is effective in conveying information&nbsp;of the nutrient content,&nbsp;does not present information in a false, misleading, deceptive, or insignificant manner, and ensures that no claim is made without proper labelling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article provides an overview of the new&nbsp;<em>Guidelines<\/em>, explores the lack of harmonisation among ASEAN Member States (hereinafter, AMSs) compared to EU nutrition labelling rules, and highlights the potential implications of establishing a harmonised nutrition labelling framework in ASEAN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>The ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nutrition labelling refers to labels that provide information on the nutrient content of food. Its purpose is to help consumers assess the nutritional value of a given product. Typically, such labels include information on various nutrients, such as energy, protein, and total fat. Currently,&nbsp;nutrition labelling practices and rules vary among AMSs, lacking harmonisation. Recognising the challenges that this poses for both consumers and businesses,&nbsp;experts from AMSs\u2019 food regulatory agencies, during the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/asean.org\/asean-to-harmonise-nutrition-labelling-for-prepared-foodstuffs-2\/\">29<sup>th<\/sup>&nbsp;PFPWG Workshop on the Harmonisation of Nutrition Labelling<\/a>&nbsp;held in November 2019, had emphasised the need to establish a standardised approach to ensure that nutrition information is presented in a clear and consistent manner. This led to the development of the&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In relevant part, the&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;contain provisions on: 1) The nutrient declaration; 2) Principles and criteria for the legibility of nutrition labelling; and 3) Supplementary nutrition information. The&nbsp;<em>ASEAN<\/em><em>Nutrition Labelling&nbsp;Guidelines<\/em>, provide that a nutrient declaration, which refers to a standardised statement or listing of the nutrient content of a food, should be mandatory for all prepackaged foods. It also stipulates that nutrition declarations must be presented in numerical form, including when providing information, such as the energy value, amounts of protein, fat, and saturated fat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Point 4.1 of the&nbsp;<em>ASEAN<\/em>&nbsp;<em>Nutrition Labelling&nbsp;Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;recommends that, in presenting the mandatory nutrition information, it should follow Sections 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.1.3, and 8.2 of the Codex Alimentarius&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fao.org\/fao-who-codexalimentarius\/sh-proxy\/fr\/?lnk=1&amp;url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FStandards%252FCXS%2B1-1985%252FCXS_001e.pdf\"><em>General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods<\/em><\/a>, which require the nutrient labelling of prepackaged food to,&nbsp;<em>inter alia<\/em>, not be separated from the container, to be clear, readily legible, and in a language acceptable to the consumer. The&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;further provide that supplementary nutrition information, which refers to additional details regarding the nutritional value of the food, may be used to enhance consumer understanding and assist in interpreting nutrient declarations. Its use is optional and should accompany, rather than replace, nutrient declarations, except for target populations with high illiteracy or limited nutrition knowledge, where symbols or visuals may be used on their own.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrient Labelling Guidelines&nbsp;<\/em>are non-binding, it is for AMSs to decide whether to follow the recommendations. However, the&nbsp;<em>Guidelines<\/em>\u2019 potential impact should not be dismissed. Notably, the&nbsp;<em>Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;could provide a common reference point to \u201c<em>bridge<\/em>\u201d regulatory gaps, especially among least-developed AMSs, in shaping their domestic regulations, and could also mark the first step towards the eventual development of a binding ASEAN instrument on nutrition labelling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Front-of-packaging nutrient labelling under the ASEAN Nutrient Labelling Guidelines<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In addition to nutrition labelling, a key novelty of the&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrient Labelling Guidelines&nbsp;<\/em>is<em>&nbsp;<\/em>Annex 2 on front-of-pack (hereinafter, FoP) nutrition labelling, a form of supplementary nutrition information that presents simplified nutrition information on the FoP of prepackaged foods, which is growing in popularity in AMSs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Annex provides general guidelines for the establishment of FoP nutrition labelling systems in order to help consumers in making appropriate comparisons between foods. The Annex includes,&nbsp;<em>inter alia<\/em>, recommendations that FoP nutritional labelling be government-led, limited to a single system per country, and defining food products that should be exempt from FoP schemes, such as&nbsp;infant formula and food for medical purposes.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Towards greater harmonisation of nutrition labelling?&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nutrition labelling regulations continue to vary across ASEAN. While AMSs\u2019 domestic regulations generally provide for similar definitions of \u2018<em>nutrition labelling<\/em>\u2019, nutrition labelling is mandatory only in a few AMSs, while it remains voluntary in others. Notably, several AMSs that initially had voluntary rules on nutrition labelling, such as Cambodia, have since made it mandatory, reflecting a gradual move towards mandatory labelling and regional alignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In other jurisdictions, detailed rules exist. For instance, the EU has adopted harmonised rules on nutrition labelling, as regulated under&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A02011R1169-20250401\"><em>Regulation (EU) No 1169\/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers<\/em><\/a>. This Regulation requires the vast majority of prepacked foods to bear a nutrition declaration, which must provide the energy value and the amounts of fat, saturates, carbohydrate, sugars, protein, and salt in the food, and may be supplemented with voluntary information on nutrients, such as the amounts of fibre, vitamins, and minerals. At the same time, aggregate FoP nutrition labelling has not yet been harmonised in the EU.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Towards the broader adoption of Front-of-Pack nutrition labelling?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Among AMSs,&nbsp;Singapore has introduced the most detailed rules on nutrition labelling. Not only is the labelling mandatory, but the country has also introduced the \u2018<em>Nutri-Grade<\/em>\u2019 labelling scheme, as regulated under the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/sso.agc.gov.sg\/SL-Supp\/S993-2021\/Published\/20211230?DocDate=20211230\"><em>Sale Of Food Act (Chapter 283) Food (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 2021<\/em><\/a>. Unlike the detailed nutrition labelling, the \u2018<em>Nutri-Grade<\/em>\u2019 labelling scheme classifies beverages from \u2018<em>Grade A<\/em>\u2019 to \u2018<em>D<\/em>\u2019 based on sugar and fat content, and requires a FoP label to inform consumers of the nutritional value at a single glance (<em>e.g.<\/em>, \u2018<em>Grade A<\/em>\u2019 has lower sugar and fat content, which may be healthier) (see&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives<\/em>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/trade-perspectives\/24-april-2023\/#Nutri-Grade\">Issue No. 8 of 24 April 2023<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Indonesia appears to follow Singapore\u2019s approach, having published a draft&nbsp;<em>Regulation on Nutritional Value Information on Food Labels to implement Government Regulation No. 28 of 2024 on the Implementation of the Health Law<\/em>, which seeks to make the \u2018<em>Nutri-Level<\/em>\u2019 FoP nutrition labelling scheme mandatory for packaged food products sold in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The&nbsp;<em>ASEAN Nutrition Labelling Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;could open up the possibility of moving towards harmonised FoP nutrition labelling in the future by serving as a framework that AMSs can build upon. This is particularly relevant given the challenges in adopting FoP schemes in ASEAN, due to opposition by the food industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the EU, the \u2018<em>Nutri<\/em>&#8211;<em>Score<\/em>\u2019, comparable to \u2018<em>Nutri-Grade<\/em>\u2019 in Singapore and&nbsp;\u2018<em>Nutri-Level<\/em>\u2019 in Indonesia,&nbsp;has been adopted in various EU Member States, including France and Germany.&nbsp;Although&nbsp;the EU is in the process of developing a harmonised FoP nutrition labelling scheme (see&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives<\/em>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/trade-perspectives\/1-july-2024\/#Portugal%20food%20law\">Issue No. 13 of 1 July 2024<\/a>), the legislative proposal has been delayed due to industry pushback, particularly from food industry bodies and governments like Italy\u2019s, which fear that a \u2018<em>Nutri<\/em>&#8211;<em>Score<\/em>\u2019-like approach could negatively impact sales.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Implications for stakeholders<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a>The&nbsp;<\/a><em>ASEAN&nbsp;<\/em><em>Nutrition Labelling&nbsp;Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;carry significance by guiding AMSs in developing new or revising existing nutrition labelling regulations, including FoP schemes, while promoting alignment with Codex Alimentarius standards. The&nbsp;<em>Guidelines<\/em>&nbsp;could serve as a regional benchmark, helping to reduce regulatory differences among AMSs, facilitating intra-ASEAN trade, and potentially laying the groundwork for future binding commitments within the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Food\"><strong>Does existing EU law adequately address \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 of food products? EU Member States address growing concerns<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>By&nbsp;<em>Amanda Carlota<\/em>,&nbsp;<em>Ignacio Carre\u00f1o Garc\u00eda, and Tobias Dolle<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2018<em>Shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 refers to the practice of reducing the weight or quantity of a product without changing or even increasing its price without adequately informing consumers. This commercial practice is a growing concern within the EU. Some EU Member States, notably France, and Italy, have taken steps to address the issue. Most recently, on 5 September 2025, Belgium<em>&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.brusselstimes.com\/1733312\/belgium-to-tackle-shrinkflation-with-clear-label-on-food\">announced<\/a>&nbsp;similar plans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article assesses whether existing EU rules adequately address \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 and examines which requirements EU Member States\u2019 measures need to fulfil to be deemed compatible with EU law.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u2018<em>Shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 identified as a pricing practices affecting consumer trust<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In July 2025, the European Parliament\u2019s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) held a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/committees\/en\/rise-of-consumer-prices-in-the-single-ma\/product-details\/20250708CHE13263\">public hearing<\/a>&nbsp;on the&nbsp;<em>\u2018Rise of consumer prices in the internal market<\/em>\u2019, in which \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 was identified as one of the pricing practices that \u201c<em>may be affecting consumer trust and contributing to market fragmentation and regulatory gaps<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to the European Commission\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"chrohttps:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/document\/download\/2816337b-4fd1-4db2-a71c-d14a206a5a93_en?filename=consumer_conditions_scoreboard_2025_final.pdf\"><em>2025 Consumer Conditions Scoreboard<\/em><\/a>, 74% of consumers had noticed that some of the packaged goods they regularly purchase had reduced in size without a decrease in price.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Existing EU law does not specifically address \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The EU has legislated on the indication of the selling price and the price per unit of measurement, as well as on the indication of the quantity of goods (see&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives,&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/trade-perspectives\/25-january-2024\/#France\">Issue No. 1 of 25 January 2024<\/a>), but there is no specific legislation on \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019, which must, therefore, be assessed on a case-by-case basis under the general prohibition of unfair and misleading commercial practices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Article 6(1) of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/AUTO\/?uri=CELEX:32005L0029&amp;qid=1704736907898&amp;rid=1\"><em>Directive 2005\/29\/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market<\/em><\/a>states that \u201c<em>a commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct<\/em>\u201d, in relation to elements, such as quantity or price and is likely to cause the consumer to take a transactional decision that he or she would not have otherwise taken. Article 6(1) of&nbsp;<em>Directive 2005\/29\/EC<\/em>, therefore, covers factually correct information that deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer and, arguably, may be applied in case a product\u2019s size or quantity has been reduced, but where the price has stayed the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Article 7(1) of&nbsp;<em>Directive 2005\/29\/EC<\/em>&nbsp;on \u2018<em>Misleading omissions<\/em>\u2019 states that \u201c<em>A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise<\/em>\u201d. When shopping, the consumer may not have the price and quantity of a product in mind that applied three months ago. Arguably, omitting that a package has shrunk, while the price remains identical, may be considered as misleading under Article 7(1). Annex I to&nbsp;<em>Directive 2005\/29\/EC<\/em>&nbsp;lists commercial practices that are \u201c<em>in all circumstances considered unfair<\/em>\u201d, but does not currently include misleading packaging practices.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Recent legislative developments apparently do not address the matter. Although it has been discussed in the past to add misleading packaging practices to Annex I to&nbsp;<em>Directive 2005\/29\/EC<\/em>, they are not specifically listed as misleading commercial practices in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dir\/2024\/825\/oj\/eng\"><em>Directive (EU) 2024\/825 amending Directives 2005\/29\/EC as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information<\/em><\/a>. In practice, product manufacturers have faced court proceedings for reducing the quantity of their product while keeping the same packaging and price.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Germany, the Hamburg Regional Court Hamburg&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vzhh.de\/sites\/default\/files\/medien\/136\/dokumente\/2024-02-13_Urteil_Mogelpackung-Sanella-Upfield_LG-Hamburg_406_HKO_121-22.pdf\">ruled<\/a>&nbsp;on 20 February 2024 that reducing the filling quantity of a spreadable fat from 500g to 400g, while maintaining the same packaging, without sufficiently informing the consumer about the lower content, was misleading under \u00a7 5 of the German&nbsp;<em>Act Against Unfair Competition<\/em>&nbsp;(<em>Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb<\/em>, UWG), which prohibits misleading commercial practices that are likely to influence a consumer\u2019s transactional decision. On 2 September 2025, the&nbsp;<em>Hamburg Consumer Association<\/em>&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vzhh.de\/themen\/mogelpackungen\/milka-vor-gericht\">announced<\/a>&nbsp;that it was suing&nbsp;<em>Mondelez Deutschland GmbH<\/em>&nbsp;before the Bremen Regional Court for reducing the filling quantity of&nbsp;<em>Milka<\/em>&nbsp;brand chocolate bars without any clearly visible notice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Specific rules targeting \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 in some EU Member States<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As EU law does not specifically address this practice, in recent years, several EU Member States, such as France, and Italy, have adopted specific rules targeting \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019, while others, such as Belgium, are actively considering similar measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In&nbsp;<strong>France<\/strong>, since 1 July 2024, retailers in the food retail sector, with stores with more than 400 square meters, are required to inform consumers, according to the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/jorf\/id\/JORFTEXT000049502248\"><em>Order of 16 April 2024<\/em><\/a>, \u201c<em>about the price of products that have undergone a downward change in quantity at unchanged or rising purchase prices<\/em>\u201d. This information notice has to be displayed for a period of two months from the date the product is made available for sale in its reduced quantity, on the packaging of the product or on a label placed close to the product.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In&nbsp;<strong>Italy<\/strong>, the Government&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/documenti.camera.it\/leg19\/pdl\/pdf\/leg.19.pdl.camera.2022.19PDL0105220.pdf#page=73\">introduced<\/a>&nbsp;a new&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.normattiva.it\/uri-res\/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2005-09-06;206\">Article 15-bis<\/a>&nbsp;to the&nbsp;<em>Consumer Code<\/em>&nbsp;on \u201c<em>Measures to counter the commercial practices of resizing pre-packaged products<\/em>\u201d. Since 1 October 2025, it requires that \u201c<em>Producers who offer for sale, also through distributors operating in Italy, a consumer product that, while maintaining the previous packaging, has undergone a reduction in the nominal quantity and a related increase in the price per unit of measurement, shall inform the consumer about the reduced quantity and the increase in the price in percentage terms, by affixing a specific label with special graphic highlighting such in the sales packaging<\/em>\u201d<em>.<\/em>&nbsp;This information must be placed on the packaging, or on a sticker, for a period of six months from the date the affected product is displayed in its reduced quantity, and must include the wording: \u201c<em>This package contains a product X (unit of measurement) less than the previous quantity<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In&nbsp;<strong>Belgium<\/strong>, on 5 September 2025, Belgium\u2019s Minister responsible for Consumer Protection,&nbsp;<em>Rob Beenders,&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.brusselstimes.com\/1733312\/belgium-to-tackle-shrinkflation-with-clear-label-on-food\">announced<\/a>a plan to introduce a requirement to ensure that any changes in the quantity or weight of products are clearly displayed for consumers. Details of this planned obligation have not been disclosed yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Infringement procedure against Italy against disproportionate measure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 12 March 2025, the European Commission formally&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/inf_25_503\">opened<\/a>&nbsp;infringement proceedings by sending a letter of formal notice to Italy for failing to address the incompatibility of its labelling requirements with Articles 34 to 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/LexUriServ\/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E\/TXT:en:PDF\">TFEU<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With respect to the obligation to affix on consumer products a specific indication informing that the product\u2019s quantity has been reduced while its packaging remains unchanged, leading to an increase in the price per unit, the Commission acknowledges the importance of informing consumers about such changes. However, the Commission notes that \u201c<em>requiring this information to be displayed directly on each concerned product does not seem proportionate<\/em>\u201d and that \u201c<em>National labelling requirements constitute a major internal market barrier and seriously undermine the free movement of goods. The Commission considers that the Italian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence concerning the proportionality of the measure, as other less restrictive options are available (e.g., displaying the same information near the products concerned)<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Italy, which had two months to respond and address the shortcomings raised by the Commission. In the absence of a satisfactory response, the Commission may decide to issue a reasoned opinion. It is worth noting that the French measure has not been targeted by the Commission, which is likely due to notable differences compared to the Italian legislation. In France, the information must be provided by distributors. Most notably, France allows the information to be provided on a sign placed near the product, as an alternative to a label on the packaging. It is precisely the labelling requirement, without alternative options, that the Commission considers as creating obstacles to the free circulation of products on the EU Single Market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Outlook<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since there are strong economic incentives in the market for indirect price increases, such as \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019, the introduction of a mandatory (temporary) indication of changes in filling quantities on a sign placed near the product, as an alternative to the label on the packaging, may be considered. Once specific legislation regulating \u2018<em>shrinkflation<\/em>\u2019 is proposed in Belgium, its legality will have to be assessed in the light of EU law.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Ignacio\u00a0Carre\u00f1o Garcia<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading alignwide\" id=\"Legislation\" style=\"font-size:48px;line-height:1.1\"><strong>Recently Adopted EU Legislation<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Trade Law&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dec\/2025\/1947\/oj\/eng\"><em>Council Decision (EU) 2025\/1947 of 18 September 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Association Council established by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, with regard to a decision amending Protocol 4 to that Agreement concerning the definition of the concept of \u2018originating products\u2019 and methods of administrative cooperation<\/em><\/a><br><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dec\/2025\/1948\/oj\/eng\"><em>Council Decision (EU) 2025\/1948 of 18 September 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the EU-CTC Joint Committee established by the Convention on the simplification of formalities in trade in goods and within the EU-CTC Joint Committee established by the Convention on a Common transit procedure as regards the adoption of decisions inviting the Republic of Moldova and Montenegro to accede to those Conventions and as regards the adoption of decisions amending the Convention on a common transit procedure following the Republic of Moldova\u2019s and Montenegro\u2019s accession to that Convention<\/em><\/a><br><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/notice\/2025\/1962\/oj\/eng\"><em>Notice concerning the entry into force of the Protocol amending the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies<\/em><\/a><br><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg_impl\/2025\/1909\/oj\/eng\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/1909 of 24 September 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 978\/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the suspension for the years 2026-2028 of certain tariff preferences granted to certain GSP beneficiary countries<\/em><\/a><em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501330\"><\/a><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-preformatted\"><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Trade Remedies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501728&amp;qid=1754882567137\">Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/1901 of 22 September 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of glyoxylic acid originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China<\/a><\/em><br><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501728&amp;qid=1754882567137\">Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/1919 of 25 September 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam, and terminating the investigation on imports thereof originating in India<\/a><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Customs Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501957\"><em>Council Decision (EU) 2025\/1957 of 18 September 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Association Committee in Trade Configuration established by the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, as regards the reduction and elimination of customs duties<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501961\"><em>Decision No 1\/2025 of the EU-Moldova Association Committee in Trade Configuration of 19 September 2025 on the reduction and elimination of customs duties pursuant to Article 147(4) of the Association Agreement between<\/em><\/a><em>\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501961\"><em>the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part [2025\/1961]<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Food Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Food Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dec_impl\/2025\/1898\/oj\/eng\"><em>Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025\/1898 of 22 September 2025 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP51291 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829\/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/dec_impl\/2025\/1900\/oj\"><em>Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025\/1900 of 22 September 2025 establishing the annual programme of controls for 2026 to be carried out by Commission experts in the Member States to verify the application of Union agri-food chain legislation<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg_impl\/2025\/1908\/oj\/eng\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/1908 of 24 September 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 37\/2010 as regards the classification of the substance fluralaner with respect to its maximum residue limit in foodstuffs of animal origin<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg_impl\/2025\/2011\/oj\/eng\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2011 of 1 October 2025 amending Annexes V and XIV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021\/404 as regards the entries for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the lists of third countries, territories, or zones thereof authorised for the entry into the Union of consignments of poultry and germinal products of poultry, and of fresh meat of poultry and game birds<\/em><\/a><em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501321\"><\/a><\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Imelda Jo Anastasya, Amanda Carlota, Ignacio Carre\u00f1o Garc\u00eda, Joanna Christy, Tobias Dolle, Alya Mahira, Stella Nalwoga, and Paolo R. Vergano contributed to this issue.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Follow us on&nbsp;<\/em><em>Bluesky&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/fratinivergano.bsky.social\"><em>@fratinivergano.bsky.social<\/em><\/a><strong><em><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To subscribe to&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives<\/em><sup>\u00a9<\/sup>, please click&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mailchi.mp\/fratinivergano.eu\/tradeperspectives_subscription\">here<\/a>. To unsubscribe, please click&nbsp;<a href=\"mailto:TradePerspectives@fratinivergano.eu?subject=Trade%20Perspectives%20Subscription\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1621","trade-perspectives","type-trade-perspectives","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1621","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/trade-perspectives"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1621\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1624,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1621\/revisions\/1624"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1621"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}