{"id":1644,"date":"2025-11-04T13:13:51","date_gmt":"2025-11-04T13:13:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/?post_type=trade-perspectives&#038;p=1644"},"modified":"2025-11-04T13:13:52","modified_gmt":"2025-11-04T13:13:52","slug":"3-november-2025","status":"publish","type":"trade-perspectives","link":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/trade-perspectives\/3-november-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"3 November 2025"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong><a href=\"#EU\">China&#8217;s expanding export controls on critical minerals: A questionable legal rationale and significant impact for EU supply chains<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#Indonesia\">The complexities of <em>halal<\/em> trade: Indonesia issues new rules for recognising and registering foreign <em>halal<\/em> certificates<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#EU-Food\">EU study reveals significant fraud and safety issues in cinnamon marketed in the EU: A need for stricter quality controls and official controls?<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong><a href=\"#Legislation\">Recently adopted EU legislation<\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"EU\"><strong>China\u2019s expanding export controls on critical minerals: A questionable legal rationale and significant impact for EU supply chains<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>By Tobias Dolle, Stella Nalwoga, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 31 October 2025, the EU and China held a high-level meeting in Brussels as part of the&nbsp;<em>EU-China Export Control Dialogue<\/em>, which was intended to address the EU\u2019s growing concerns over China\u2019s tightening export controls on critical raw materials and related technologies, which are significantly affecting EU supply chains. On 9 October 2025, the Government of China had&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/ckgzl0nwvd7o\">announced<\/a>&nbsp;new restrictions on exports of rare earths and other critical materials, thereby broadening the scope of the export restrictions. Under the future measures, trade in products manufactured outside China using mere traces of certain minerals sourced from China would require authorisation from the Government of China.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article provides a brief overview of China\u2019s current export control regime and some of the proposed measures, assesses the consistency of the proposed measures with the rules of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter, WTO), as well as their implications for business and trading partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>China\u2019s legal framework on export controls&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Export controls are measures imposed to regulate the export of sensitive goods, certain technology, and services for purposes of national security, foreign policy objectives, or other public interests. One of the core targets of many export control regimes are \u2018<em>dual-use\u2019&nbsp;<\/em>goods, which refers to items that can be used for both civil and military purposes and are typically subject to export authorisation requirements before they may be exported to third countries.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s legal framework on export control is established under the&nbsp;<em>Export Control Law<\/em>&nbsp;of China of 2020 and the&nbsp;<em>Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items&nbsp;<\/em>of 2024. Violations of China\u2019s Export Control Law may result in a range of administrative and criminal penalties, including monetary fines, business suspension, and revocation of export licences. Article 44 of the&nbsp;<em>Export Control Law<\/em>&nbsp;and Article 49 of the&nbsp;<em>Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items<\/em>foresee the extraterritorial applicability of export controls, applying to foreign organisations or individuals outside China transferring goods, technologies and services to specific destination countries and regions or specific organisations and individuals, which contain \u201c<em>specific<\/em>\u201d China-origin \u2018<em>dual-use<\/em>\u2019 items.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since 2023, China has designated several critical minerals, such as rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite, and graphite products, as \u2018<em>dual-use<\/em>\u2019 items, thereby subjecting them to export licensing requirements in order to \u201c<em>safeguard national security interests and national interests<\/em>\u201d. China first&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/english.mofcom.gov.cn\/Policies\/AnnouncementsOrders\/art\/2025\/art_0dd87cbee7b045bf93fabe6ab2faceee.html\">introduced<\/a>&nbsp;export restrictions for rare earth minerals in April 2025 in response to the US\u2019 imposition of additional tariffs on imports originating from China. Rare earth minerals are essential for manufacturing technological equipment, such as electric cars, LED televisions, camera lenses, and semiconductors&nbsp;used in artificial intelligence technology. China\u2019s export controls are particularly significant as China accounts for around 60% of global rare earth mining and nearly 90% of their processing.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Recent export controls on critical minerals<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Most recently, on 9 October 2025, China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released a series of announcements expanding the scope of export controls. Among them were the&nbsp;<em>Notices No. 55<\/em>&nbsp;to&nbsp;<em>No. 58<\/em>, which placed a range of items under export control, including, certain medium and heavy rare earth products, rare-earth-related equipment and raw materials, lithium batteries, and synthetic graphite anode materials. These controls are to take effect on 8 November 2025.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofcom.gov.cn\/zwgk\/zcfb\/art\/2025\/art_7fc9bff0fb4546ecb02f66ee77d0e5f6.html\"><em>Announcement No. 61<\/em><\/a>,&nbsp;providing a&nbsp;<em>\u201cDecision on Implementing Export Controls on Certain Overseas Rare Earth Items<\/em>\u201d marked the first time that China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce had exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 49 of the&nbsp;<em>Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items<\/em>. Under Clause I of Announcement No. 61, \u201c<em>foreign organisations and individuals<\/em>\u201d, referred to as \u201c<em>specific foreign export operators<\/em>\u201d, are required to obtain an export licence from China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce before exporting certain rare earth items to \u201c<em>countries or regions outside of China<\/em>\u201d. The licensing requirement applies to three categories of exports; 1) An item \u201c<em>manufactured overseas<\/em>\u201d, which \u201c<em>contains, integrates or mixes<\/em>\u201d specified rare earth materials originating from China, where the Chinese content accounts for 0.1% or more of the item\u2019s total value; 2) Items \u201c<em>produced overseas using technologies related to rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, (&#8230;) originating in China<\/em>\u201d; and 3) Specified rare earth items originating from China. Measures 1) and 2) are scheduled to enter into force on 1 December 2025, while measure 3) has been in effect since 9 October 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 30 October 2025, following negotiations between the US and China, China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofcom.gov.cn\/xwfb\/xwfyrth\/art\/2025\/art_c42035acf50846ffb9fb4761ee224faf.html\">announced<\/a>&nbsp;that China would \u201c<em>suspend the implementation of the relevant export control and other measures announced on October 9 for one year<\/em>\u201d and would<em>&nbsp;<\/em>\u201c<em>study and refine specific plans<\/em>\u201d. The suspension, however, does not amount to a withdrawal of the measures and the export controls imposed on rare earths in April 2025 remain in force. Additionally, it remains unclear whether the suspension applies globally or solely to exports to the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>China\u2019s export controls under WTO scrutiny<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the context of international trade, export restrictions are regulated under the WTO\u2019s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, GATT). Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 prohibits WTO Members from maintaining or imposing prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, \u201c<em>whether made effective through quotas, export licences or other measures, (&#8230;) on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other Member<\/em>\u201d. China\u2019s export licensing regime on rare earths and related materials appears to constitute such a quantitative restriction. Such measure may, however, be justified under the general exceptions in Article XX or the security exceptions in Article XXI of the GATT 1994. With respect to export controls of \u2018<em>dual-use<\/em>\u2019 items, Article XXI(b)(ii) of the GATT permits a WTO Member to take \u201c<em>any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security<\/em>\u201d. In case a WTO Member launches dispute settlement proceedings against China\u2019s export licensing requirements, China would need to demonstrate the measures are indeed applied in pursuance of such objectives.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 7 and 8 July 2025, during the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.wto.org\/dol2fe\/Pages\/SS\/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:\/G\/C\/M152.pdf&amp;Open=True\">meeting<\/a>&nbsp;of the WTO Council on Trade in Goods, several WTO Members, including the EU, India, Japan, the UK, and the US, expressed their concerns with respect to China\u2019s export control regime, including with respect to the measures taken in April 2025 concerning exports of rare earths. The WTO Members raised issues related to the lack of transparency around the restrictions, the process of licence approvals, and the application of the security exceptions available under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. For example, the EU argued that the scope of China\u2019s 2025 measures was \u201c<em>very broad<\/em>\u201d and \u201c<em>negatively\u201d&nbsp;<\/em>impacted<em>&nbsp;\u201ctrade in broadly commercially available items for civilian purposes<\/em>\u201d. Additionally, the EU emphasised that China had \u201c<em>explicitly<\/em>\u201d invoked \u201c<em>national interests<\/em>\u201d, which \u201c<em>appears to go beyond the essential security rationale<\/em>\u201d. On that point, the EU concluded that China\u2019s export restrictions \u201c<em>appear at least in part unrelated to the need to protect international peace and stability and may not be justified to protect \u201cessential security interests<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In response, China defended its measures, stating that the export controls on strategic minerals were \u201c<em>consistent with international practices and do not target any specific Member<\/em>\u201d. China further noted that it was \u201c<em>accelerating the approval process of relevant export licences<\/em>\u201d and expressed willingness to \u201c<em>further enhance communication with relevant Members on export controls<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Trade disruption and EU response<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s measures already impact European supply chains for critical minerals widely used in commercial applications and the proposed measures risk to further disrupt key sectors, such as automotive, microelectronics, and chemicals, that strongly depend on imports of rare earths minerals from China. While the EU is pursuing a negotiated solution with China, it is also considering retaliatory measures available in its trade defence toolbox. On 25 October 2025, the President of the European Commission,&nbsp;<em>Ursula von der Leyen<\/em>, emphasised that, \u201c<em>in the short term, we are focusing on finding solutions with our Chinese counterparts. But we are ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed<\/em>\u201d. The EU is reportedly seeking a solution that would provide its importers with a steady flow of supplies and greater certainty and commercial predictability, such as a system of longer-term permits. If diplomatic efforts were to fail, the EU is reportedly considering a new trade measure, being described as an \u201c<em>in-kind<\/em>\u201d tariff, which would require some exporters from China to supply critical raw materials to the EU\u2019s stockpiles when shipping certain goods into the EU. Reportedly, the EU is also considering targeted export restrictions on goods and services on which China is particularly dependent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Navigating the trade and national interests nexus<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">China\u2019s expanding export controls underscore the growing challenge for businesses to navigate an era in which trade policy and national interests are becoming increasingly intertwined. The coming weeks will be critical in determining whether the&nbsp;<em>EU-China Export Control Dialogue<\/em>&nbsp;can produce a mutually acceptable outcome or whether the dispute will escalate into the EU adopting retaliatory trade measures.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Indonesia\"><strong>The complexities of\u00a0<em>halal<\/em>\u00a0trade: Indonesia issues new rules for recognising and registering foreign\u00a0<em>halal<\/em>\u00a0certificates<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>By Imelda Jo Anastasya, Joanna Christy, and Paolo R. Vergano<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 15 September 2025, Indonesia\u2019s&nbsp;<em>Halal Product Assurance Agency&nbsp;<\/em>(<em>i.e.<\/em>,&nbsp;<em>Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Produk Halal<\/em>, hereinafter, BPJPH) issued&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cmsbl.halal.go.id\/uploads\/Decree_Kepkaban_221_2025_Implementation_Procedure_of_Foreign_Halal_Certificate_Registration_bb95097144.pdf\"><em>Decree No. 221 of 2025 on Implementation Procedures of Foreign Halal Certificate Registration<\/em><\/a>, which outlines the registration process for foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates in Indonesia. Set to take effect on 15 December 2025,&nbsp;<em>Decree 221\/2025<\/em>&nbsp;provides guidance on the relevant provisions of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cmsbl.halal.go.id\/uploads\/Law_33_2014_on_Halal_Product_Assurance_8c328febdf.pdf\"><em>Law No. 33 of 2014 on Halal Product Assurance<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;(hereinafter, Halal Law) concerning the recognition of foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificates. This article provides an overview of Indonesia\u2019s&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification requirements and the registration requirements for foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificates, examines related discussions within the&nbsp;<em>World Trade Organization<\/em>&nbsp;(hereinafter, WTO), and highlights potential implications for businesses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Halal requirements in Indonesia<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Indonesia\u2019s&nbsp;<em>Halal Law<\/em>, as implemented by&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/peraturan.bpk.go.id\/Details\/304896\/pp-no-42-tahun-2024\"><em>Government Regulation No. 42 of 2024 on Implementation in the Field of Halal Product Assurance<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;(hereinafter, GR 42\/2024), requires all&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bbia.go.id\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/15.-KMA-816-TAHUN-2024.pdf\">products<\/a>&nbsp;entering, circulating, or traded in Indonesia to be certified and labelled as&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>(<em>i.e.<\/em>, \u201c<em>permissible<\/em>\u201d or \u201c<em>lawful<\/em>\u201d).&nbsp;<em>Halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification formally acknowledges that a product complies with Islamic dietary laws. Exemptions only apply to products categorised as&nbsp;<em>haram<\/em>&nbsp;(\u201c<em>forbidden<\/em>\u201d under Islamic law), such as pork and alcohol, as well as to materials inherently considered&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;as stipulated in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/halalmui.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Keputusan-Menteri-Agama-RI-No-1360-Bahan-yang-Dikecualikan-dari-Kewajiban-Sertifikasi-Halal_compressed.pdf\"><em>Minister of Religious Affairs Decree No. 1360 of 2021<\/em><\/a>, such as unprocessed plant-based ingredients. The mandatory&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification and labelling requirements are being implemented gradually over a period of eight years, with staggered deadlines for different product categories from 2026 to 2034 (see&nbsp;<em>TradePerspectives<\/em>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/static\/upload\/1\/1\/24.09_.09_TP_16-2024_.pdf\">Issue No. 16 of 9 September 2024<\/a>). The first phase, covering food and beverage products, as well as products from slaughtered animals and slaughtering services, was originally due to be implemented from 17 October 2024, but the date was postponed by two years to 17 October 2026 to give businesses additional time to comply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Mutual recognition of foreign halal certificates and registration procedures<\/em><\/strong><em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Indonesia, foreign products can be&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>-certified either by applying directly to the BPJPH or through certification by a recognised foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification body, both of which involve an on-site audit to verify the product\u2019s&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>status. Pursuant to Articles 80 and 83 of&nbsp;<em>GR 42\/2024<\/em>,&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>status is granted on a per-product basis, following an inspection of the production process by a<em>&nbsp;halal<\/em>&nbsp;auditor. Under the&nbsp;<em>Halal Law&nbsp;<\/em>and&nbsp;<em>GR 42\/2024<\/em>, foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates are recognised in Indonesia if a mutual recognition agreement (hereinafter, MRA) has been concluded between the foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification body and the BPJPH. So far, more than 90 foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification bodies have&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bpjph.halal.go.id\/datalhln\/\">concluded<\/a>&nbsp;MRAs with the BPJPH, including foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification bodies from China, the US, as well as certain EU Member States (<em>i.e.<\/em>, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain). Importantly, these MRAs are concluded for specific product types (<em>e.g.<\/em>, for \u2018<em>food<\/em>\u2019 or \u2018<em>beverages<\/em>\u2019).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Products certified as&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;by these foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification bodies do not need to obtain a new&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificate in Indonesia, but they must still be registered with the BPJPH in line with the procedures set out in&nbsp;<em>Decree 211\/2025<\/em>. Section A of Chapter II of&nbsp;<em>Decree 211\/2025<\/em>&nbsp;stipulates that applications for registering a foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificate of a product must be submitted electronically by an importer and\/or their official representative in Indonesia (<em>i.e.<\/em>, an individual who is an Indonesian citizen or a foreign national appointed by a foreign trading company or a group of foreign companies as its representative in Indonesia) through the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ptsp.halal.go.id\/\"><em>SIHALAL<\/em><\/a><em>&nbsp;<\/em>website, accompanied by a number of required documents, such as an application letter and the business licence number of the importer and\/or the official representative in Indonesia.&nbsp;<em>Decree 211\/2025<\/em>&nbsp;outlines the rules on,&nbsp;<em>inter alia<\/em>, the renewal of the registration, and sanctions for violations related to foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification registration (<em>e.g.<\/em>, submitting false information).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>WTO Members\u2019 concerns over Indonesia\u2019s mandatory halal certification and labelling<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Several WTO Members have raised&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/tradeconcerns.wto.org\/en\/stcs\/details?imsId=502&amp;domainId=TBT\">concerns<\/a>&nbsp;over Indonesia&#8217;s mandatory&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification and labelling requirements during meetings of the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).&nbsp;The EU and US noted that these requirements could hinder their trade with Indonesia and that registration obligations for foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates appeared unnecessary, costly, and duplicative.&nbsp;Therefore,&nbsp;Indonesia\u2019s decision to postpone the deadline for mandatory&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;requirements for the first phase of products by two years, along with the conclusion of MRAs for&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;product assurance, has been welcomed.&nbsp;While MRAs facilitate the trade of foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>products, they remain limited both&nbsp;geographically and by sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Article 2.1 of the&nbsp;<em>TBT Agreement<\/em>&nbsp;requires WTO Members to accord imported products treatment no less favourable than that given to \u2018<em>like<\/em>\u2019 domestic or other foreign products. Through the MRAs, Indonesia recognises&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates issued by foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification bodies as equivalent to those issued by the BPJPH. While foreign businesses may apply for<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification through the BPJPH, the process is more costly and burdensome, notably as it requires covering the travel expenses of Indonesian&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>auditors to conduct on-site inspections. The&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification requirement could become a significant trade barrier, especially for traders in countries with few or no recognised certification bodies, potentially raising concerns under Article 2.2 of the&nbsp;<em>TBT Agreement<\/em>, which<em>&nbsp;<\/em>provides that technical regulations adopted by WTO Members must not create \u201c<em>unnecessary obstacles to international trade<\/em>\u201d. Especially the registration requirement for foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates could be considered such unnecessary obstacle, as it could be costly and duplicative, given that businesses will have to undergo the additional registration process with the BPJPH for foreign&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certificates, despite already having obtained certification from a recognised foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>The complexities of importing halal products into Indonesia \u2013 the example of coffee<\/em><\/strong><em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From 17 October 2026, coffee will be among the food products that must be&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>-certified<em>&nbsp;<\/em>in order<em>&nbsp;<\/em>to be placed on the Indonesian market. Businesses that wish to export coffee to Indonesia under the mutual recognition scheme must first verify whether the relevant foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification body has concluded an MRA with the BPJPH. In such case, businesses can obtain&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification from that certification body after the products\u2019&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;status has been verified during an on-site audit, and then register the certificate in Indonesia through the&nbsp;<em>SIHALAL&nbsp;<\/em>system. For example, a Belgian business wishing to export coffee to Indonesia only needs a&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificate for the final coffee product (<em>e.g.<\/em>, ground coffee). Pursuant to Article 70 of&nbsp;<em>GR 42\/2024<\/em>, unprocessed plant materials (<em>e.g.<\/em>, raw coffee beans imported by the Belgian business for processing) are exempt from the&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification requirement, as plant-based materials are presumed&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>. When obtaining a foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificate from a foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification body (<em>i.e.<\/em>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/hfce.eu\/\"><em>Halal Food Council Belgium<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/hqc.eu\/en\"><em>Halal Quality Control Group Belgium<\/em><\/a>), the Belgian business must ensure that its production processes comply with&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;standards. When the final coffee product has been&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>-certified by the foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certification body, the foreign&nbsp;<em>halal&nbsp;<\/em>certificate must be registered with BPJPH by the importer and\/or official representative in Indonesia for the product to be permitted entry into Indonesia.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Towards implementation from 2026<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Food and beverage businesses and traders should prepare for compliance with the&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification requirements from 17 October 2026. The same deadline applies to traditional medicines, quasi-medicines, and health supplements under the second phase of the mandate. Businesses are advised to begin preparations early to obtain&nbsp;<em>halal<\/em>&nbsp;certification, as no postponement has been announced for this phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Paolo R. Vergano&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"EU-Food\"><strong>EU study reveals significant fraud and safety issues in cinnamon marketed in the EU: A need for stricter quality controls and official controls?<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>By&nbsp;<em>Amanda Carlota<\/em>,&nbsp;<em>Ignacio Carre\u00f1o Garc\u00eda, and Tobias Dolle<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 24 September 2025, the European Commission\u2019s (hereinafter, Commission)&nbsp;<em>Joint Research Centre<\/em>&nbsp;(hereinafter, JRC) published the results of a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu\/repository\/handle\/JRC142672\">study<\/a>&nbsp;on cinnamon marketed in the EU. The study&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu\/jrc-news-and-updates\/commission-finds-fraud-and-potential-safety-issues-cinnamon-eu-market-2025-09-24_en\">reveals<\/a>&nbsp;that more than 66% of the samples \u201c<em>failed to meet international quality standards, were non-compliant with EU food safety legislation, suspected of fraud, and\/or potential exceeded the legal coumarin limits<\/em>\u201d.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The article provides an introduction on the origins of cinnamon, a summary of the findings of the JRC\u2019s study, and discusses the EU regulatory framework applicable to cinnamon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>The origins of cinnamon and related international standards<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cinnamon is a spice that originated from the genus&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum<\/em>&nbsp;and belongs to the&nbsp;<em>Lauraceae<\/em>&nbsp;family. It includes about 250 species, many of them aromatic and flavouring, spread over Australia, China, and South and South East Asia. There are two main botanical types of cinnamon:&nbsp;<em>Ceylon cinnamon<\/em>&nbsp;(<em>Cinnamomum verum&nbsp;<\/em>or&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum zeylanicum Blume<\/em>), native to Sri Lanka, and&nbsp;<em>Cassia<\/em>&nbsp;(<em>Cinnamomum cassia&nbsp;<\/em>or&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum aromaticum<\/em>), native to Myanmar, a less expensive and lower quality alternative with stronger taste, which naturally contains coumarin, a natural compound found in many plants, and potentially toxic for the liver. According to the JRC, the most commercially valued cinnamon is the dried inner bark of the tree&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum verum<\/em>, native to Sri Lanka.&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum verum&nbsp;<\/em>is also produced in small quantities in India, Madagascar, and Seychelles.&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum Cassia<\/em>&nbsp;has several species: Chinese cassia (<em>C. cassia syn. C. aromatica<\/em>) from China and Viet Nam, Vietnamese cassia (<em>C. loureiroi<\/em>), Indonesian cassia (<em>C. burmannii<\/em>) from Sumatra and Java, and Indian cassia (<em>C. tamala<\/em>) from north-eastern India and Myanmar.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To define quality, the&nbsp;<em>International Organization for Standardization<\/em>&nbsp;(ISO) has established international standards for cinnamon, notably for Ceylon cinnamon (<a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.standards.iteh.ai\/samples\/64797\/c7325e9819ff4138a345cff44982e61f\/ISO-6539-2014.pdf\">ISO 6539:2014<\/a>) from Madagascar, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka, as well as for Cassia cinnamon (<a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.standards.iteh.ai\/samples\/22118\/94a710f203ef4407835d13f83f3983aa\/ISO-6538-1997.pdf\">ISO 6538.1997<\/a>), specifically for Chinese, Indonesian, and Vietnamese cassia. The standards provide guidelines for quality control and testing to minimise the risk of contamination and outline quality standards, including characteristics like flavour, and defining types and classifications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>The EU regulatory framework for cinnamon<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cinnamon marketed in the EU must comply with the general food safety rules set out in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A02002R0178-20240701\"><em>Regulation (EC) No 178\/2002<\/em><\/a>. Additionally,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2023\/915\/oj\/eng\"><em>Regulation (EU) 2023\/915<\/em><\/a><em>&nbsp;<\/em>sets maximum levels for certain contaminants in food, including a maximum level of 2\u2009mg of lead per kg of \u201c<em>bark spices<\/em>\u201d, which includes cinnamon.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2008\/1333\/oj\/eng\"><em>Regulation (EC) No 1333\/2008<\/em>&nbsp;<em>on food additives<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;sets a maximum level of 150\u2009mg of sulphur dioxide-sulphites (E 220-228) per kg in \u201c<em>only<\/em>&nbsp;<em>Cinnamomum ceylanicum<\/em>\u201d.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2008\/1334\/oj\/eng\"><em>Regulation (EC) No 1334\/2008 on flavourings and certain food ingredients with flavouring properties<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;sets maximum levels of coumarin of 1) 15\u2009mg\/kg in fine bakery ware, with the exception of traditional and\/or seasonal bakery ware, labelled as containing cinnamon, and of 2) 50\u2009mg\/kg in traditional and\/or seasonal bakery products labelled as containing cinnamon. While EU legislation establishes maximum levels for coumarin in processed products, such as bakery products, there are no such maximum levels for coumarin that can be naturally present in cinnamon as such. In fact, the JRC study suggests the need to address this issue, especially if cinnamon is increasingly used as an ingredient. Finally, with respect to cinnamon and cinnamon-tree flowers from India,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A02019R1793-20250812\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019\/1793<\/em><\/a>mandates a temporary increase of the frequency of official controls to 20% at entry into the EU in view of pesticide residues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With respect to labelling, both types of cinnamon are often simply labelled as \u2018<em>cinnamon<\/em>\u2019. Under EU law, the indication of the country of origin for spices is currently not mandatory unless, as regulated by Article 7(1)(a) of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/ALL\/?uri=celex%3A32011R1169\"><em>Regulation (EU) No 1169\/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers<\/em><\/a>, the lack of it would mislead consumers, such as when product packaging wrongly suggests that the product originates in Sri Lanka.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Fraud and failure to comply with international quality standards and EU food law<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As part of the Commission\u2019s efforts to fight fraud in the herbs and spices sector, the JRC\u2019s study reveals cases of fraud and non-compliance with EU food safety legislation. JRC scientists used four innovative screening methods to detect and identify possible fraudulent practices. The JRC went beyond identifying the substitution of&nbsp;<em>Ceylon cinnamon<\/em>&nbsp;with&nbsp;<em>cassia<\/em>, identified other likely types of substitution, and investigated compliance with existing EU legislation and with international standards. The analysis involved 104 cinnamon samples, purchased at retailers in 10 EU Member States, as well as in Serbia, Sri Lanka, and the UK. More than 66% of the samples failed to meet international quality standards, were non-compliant with EU food safety legislation, suspected of fraud, and\/or potentially exceeded the legal coumarin levels. With respect to fraud, as much as 9% of the samples labelled as&nbsp;<em>Ceylon cinnamon<\/em>&nbsp;were found to be totally or partially substituted by&nbsp;<em>Cassia cinnamon<\/em>. Other types of fraud, such as substitution of bark by other parts of the cinnamon tree such as roots, leaves, and flowers, were suspected in a high rate of samples. Moreover, around 21% of the samples failed to meet international standards due to a high total ash content, which is an important quality control parameter.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With respect to food safety, the study also showed that 9.6% of the samples did not comply with the maximum level set for lead by EU legislation and that 31 of the analysed samples were potentially hazardous for children due to a high coumarin content. The JRC concludes that standardised methods were needed, given that \u201c<em>the type of irregularities detected in cinnamon, including fraudulent practises, is diverse and cannot be addressed with only one analytical technique<\/em>\u201d and that all stakeholders in the sector, policy makers, control laboratories, and manufacturers alike should pay attention to \u201c<em>the high rate of irregular cinnamon samples in the European market<\/em>\u201d<em>.&nbsp;<\/em>The JRC \u201c<em>proposes analytical techniques that can be used as screening and confirmatory methods which could be adopted by official control laboratories to detect fraudulent samples with higher accuracy<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>An attractive target for fraudsters<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Currently, global production of cinnamon is dominated by China, Indonesia, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam, which together&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fao.org\/faostat\/en\/#home\">account<\/a>&nbsp;for more than 99% of the world\u2019s production of 238,105 tonnes in 2023. China and Viet Nam produce around 66% of the world\u2019s cinnamon. In 2023, according to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/eurostat\/databrowser\/view\/ds-045409__custom_13826197\/bookmark\/table?lang=en&amp;bookmarkId=ec72b0fc-6ef3-4c5c-89b0-0e23df8a9dcc\"><em>Eurostat<\/em><\/a>, cinnamon was the fifth most imported spice in the EU, after ginger, paprika, pepper and turmeric, with 13,300 tonnes imported, notably from Viet Nam 4,690 tonnes, Indonesia 4,348 tonnes, China 1,523 tonnes, Madagascar 1,343 tonnes, Sri Lanka 970 tonnes, and India 115 tonnes.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to the JRC, with cinnamon demand expected to grow over the next years, cinnamon is an attractive target for fraudsters. The study notes that \u201c<em>The significant price difference between Ceylon and Cassia cinnamon, the former having approximately twice the price of the later, creates a motivation for adulteration or enhancement with additives, in addition to the general risk of fraudulent practices associated with spices, which are among the most vulnerable food commodities<\/em>\u201d. These fraudulent practices may include the substitution (partial or complete) of&nbsp;<em>Ceylon cinnamon<\/em>&nbsp;by&nbsp;<em>Cassia cinnamon<\/em>, particularly in ground cinnamon products, or the adulteration of either&nbsp;<em>Ceylon<\/em>&nbsp;or&nbsp;<em>Cassia<\/em>&nbsp;cinnamon with parts of the cinnamon plant other than the bark (<em>e.g.<\/em>, root, leaves, flowers, seeds), or with a different plant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Enhanced quality controls and increased official controls?&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The JRC notes that results of its investigation could \u201c<em>help the scientific community and policy makers to set threshold values for the different cinnamon components, and to define when to consider a sample as suspicious<\/em>\u201d, noting that this would<em>&nbsp;<\/em>\u201c<em>allow to undertake a more detailed surveillance and help competent authorities take action<\/em>\u201d. Operators should be prepared to address increased controls on cinnamon imported into the EU and should participate in shaping potentially upcoming EU legislation by interacting with EU Institutions, Governments, relevant trade associations, and other affected stakeholders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>For any additional information or legal advice on this matter, please contact Ignacio&nbsp;<\/em><\/strong><strong><em>Carre\u00f1o Garcia<\/em><\/strong><strong><em><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"Legislation\"><strong>Recently adopted EU legislation<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Trade Law&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2025\/2083\/oj\/eng\"><em>Regulation (EU) 2025\/2083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2023\/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202502165\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Council Decision (EU) 2025\/2165 of 20 October 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Trade Council established by the Interim Agreement on Trade between the<\/em><\/a><em>\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202502165\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>European Union and the Republic of Chile, as regards the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Trade Council and the rules of procedure of the Trade Committee<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202502201\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Decision No 2\/2025 of the EU-Common Transit Countries Joint Committee of 19 September 2025 as regards the amendments of Appendices III and IIIa to the Convention on a common transit procedure for the accession of Montenegro [2025\/2201]<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a><\/a><a><\/a><a><\/a><a><\/a><strong>Trade Remedies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502081&amp;qid=1760937563680\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)\u00a02025\/2081 of 17\u00a0October\u00a02025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of steel track shoes originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502118&amp;qid=1761094593603\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2118 of 21 October 2025 reimposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain rainbow trout originating in T\u00fcrkiye following the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in case T-122\/23<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502144&amp;qid=1761094593603\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2144 of 21 October 2025 making imports of pea protein originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China subject to registration<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502153&amp;qid=1761194526520\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2153 of 22\u00a0October\u00a02025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of screws without heads originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China, and levying the definitive anti-dumping duty on the registered imports of screws without heads originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502146&amp;qid=1761194526520\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2146 of 22\u00a0October\u00a02025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People\u2019s Republic of China as extended to imports of bicycles consigned from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Cambodia, Pakistan and the Philippines, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016\/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202502199\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2199 of 27 October 2025 amending Implementing Regulations (EU) 2020\/1988 and (EU) 2020\/761 as regards the quantities that may be imported under<\/em><\/a><em>\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202502199\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>certain tariff quotas following the amendment of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Customs Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/AUTO\/?uri=OJ:L_202502173&amp;qid=1761793431650&amp;rid=5\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2173 of 29 October 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020\/761 regarding proof of origin for certain tariff rate quotas in the poultry sector and the information to be mentioned on digital certificates of origin<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Food Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ%3AL_202502138&amp;qid=1761094593603\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025\/2138 of 21 October 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021\/1378 as regards the recognition of certain control bodies in accordance with Article 46 of Regulation (EU) 2018\/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council as competent to carry out controls and issue organic certificates in third countries for the purpose of imports of organic products into the Union<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=OJ:L_202501449\"><em>Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025\/1449 of 18 July 2025 amending Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853\/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning specific hygiene rules for emergency slaughter of domestic ungulates, for tuna frozen in brine and for highly refined products<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/AUTO\/?uri=OJ:L_202502181&amp;qid=1761793431650&amp;rid=6\"><em>Commission Regulation (EU) 2025\/2181 of 29 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 142\/2011 regarding requirements for the import of used cooking oil<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Imelda Jo Anastasya, Amanda Carlota, Ignacio Carre\u00f1o Garc\u00eda, Pattranit Chantaplaboon<\/em>,<em>&nbsp;Joanna Christy, Tobias Dolle, Alya Mahira, Stella Nalwoga, and Paolo R. Vergano contributed to this issue.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Follow us on&nbsp;<\/em><em>Bluesky&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/fratinivergano.bsky.social\"><em>@fratinivergano.bsky.social<\/em><\/a><strong><em><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To subscribe to&nbsp;<em>Trade Perspectives<\/em><sup>\u00a9<\/sup>, please click&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mailchi.mp\/fratinivergano.eu\/tradeperspectives_subscription\">here<\/a>. To unsubscribe, please click&nbsp;<a href=\"mailto:TradePerspectives@fratinivergano.eu?subject=Trade%20Perspectives%20Subscription\">here<\/a><a>.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1644","trade-perspectives","type-trade-perspectives","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1644","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/trade-perspectives"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1644\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1647,"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/trade-perspectives\/1644\/revisions\/1647"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fratinivergano.eu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1644"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}